India hasn't been able to shield itself fully from 'ravages' of Trump's policies: Ex-envoy Dogra
A former Indian diplomat, in a recent assessment, noted that India has not been able to fully shield itself from the effects of recent US trade and foreign policy measures despite pursuing an independent foreign policy
The assessment noted that India is not dependent on the United States for financial or strategic support, unlike some other US partners
It observed that European powers are dealing with their own internal challenges, while Russia and China have deepened coordination in ways that affect India's security calculus
The broader point made was that the United States is no longer the sole power shaping international outcomes, in a shift toward a more multipolar order
Strategic Autonomy: Doctrine and Evolution
Strategic autonomy is India's foreign-policy doctrine of retaining freedom of action in international affairs — avoiding binding alliance commitments while engaging multiple powers on an issue-by-issue basis. It is the direct descendant of India's Cold War-era Non-Alignment, adapted to a multipolar, economically interdependent world.
Key Details
- Non-Alignment as a formal movement traces to the Belgrade Conference of 1961, co-founded by India (Nehru), Yugoslavia (Tito), Egypt (Nasser), Indonesia (Sukarno), and Ghana (Nkrumah), itself building on the 1955 Bandung Conference
- Post-Cold War, India's approach evolved into what officials now term "multi-alignment" — issue-based cooperation with a wide range of partners (US, Russia, EU, Gulf states, Japan) without formal military-alliance obligations
- India has signed multiple free trade agreements in 2026, including with the EU and the UK, as part of diversifying trade dependence away from any single power
- Strategic autonomy is distinct from "isolationism" — it explicitly permits deep bilateral partnerships (such as the India-US Quad engagement or India-Russia defence ties) so long as no partnership becomes an exclusive, binding alliance
The commentary's core point — that India retains policy independence but still absorbs real economic costs from major-power friction — illustrates the practical limits of strategic autonomy: freedom from formal alliance obligations does not equal insulation from a dominant trading partner's unilateral measures.
US Tariff Measures on India (2025-26) and Their Trajectory
Escalating US tariffs on Indian exports through much of 2025, tied explicitly to India's continued purchase of Russian oil, became the most significant recent test of India's ability to absorb external economic pressure without changing its core strategic positioning.
Key Details
- The US imposed a 25% "reciprocal" tariff on Indian goods in 2025, followed by an additional 25% tariff explicitly linked to India's imports of Russian crude oil, taking the combined rate to 50% — among the highest US tariffs on any trading partner at the time
- The escalation was framed by the US as a response to Russia's actions in Ukraine, treating India's oil purchases as indirectly funding the conflict
- Tariffs were subsequently reduced to around 18% in early 2026 after negotiations, alongside India agreeing to scale back Russian oil purchases — illustrating a policy adjustment made without India abandoning its broader strategic-autonomy framing
- Separately, other bilateral irritants (visa policy changes affecting Indian nationals, rhetoric questioning the scale of India-US trade) have added friction beyond tariffs alone
This tariff episode is the concrete economic mechanism behind the "hasn't been able to shield itself fully" observation — even a country committed to strategic autonomy remains exposed to a major trading partner's unilateral tariff powers, since autonomy is a foreign-policy stance, not an economic firewall.
CAATSA and the India-Russia Defence Relationship
The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is the clearest example of how India's continued defence ties with Russia create recurring friction points with the United States, testing strategic autonomy in the defence domain specifically.
Key Details
- CAATSA was enacted by the US Congress in 2017, authorising sanctions on entities conducting significant transactions with Russia's defence and intelligence sectors
- India's 2018 purchase of the Russian S-400 Triumf air defence system triggered CAATSA exposure; successive US administrations have used discretionary waiver authority (expanded under the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act) to avoid sanctioning India, citing India's strategic importance in countering China
- The waiver pattern shows the practical accommodation major powers make for India's autonomy even while formally reserving punitive tools — a template distinct from the blanket sanctions imposed on Turkey for the same S-400 purchase
Russia's deepening coordination with China, flagged in the assessment as a factor affecting India's security calculus, sits alongside India's own unresolved Russia-linked friction points with Washington (CAATSA exposure, oil-purchase tariffs) — both stem from the same structural tension between India's Russia ties and its US partnership.
- Non-Alignment Movement founded: Belgrade Conference, 1961 (building on the 1955 Bandung Conference)
- Combined US tariff on Indian goods at 2025 peak: 50% (25% reciprocal + 25% Russian-oil-linked)
- US tariff on India reduced to approximately 18% in early 2026 following negotiations
- CAATSA enacted: 2017; India's S-400 purchase: 2018, triggering (waived) CAATSA exposure
- Turkey, unlike India, was sanctioned under CAATSA for its S-400 purchase — a contrasting precedent
- India signed free trade agreements with the EU and the UK in 2026 as part of trade diversification