Pause welcome but path ahead forbidding: Five key minefields amid US-Iran chasm
Analysts and diplomatic observers identified five principal obstacles that could derail the US-Iran ceasefire from becoming a durable agreement: (1) uranium enrichment rights; (2) sanctions relief sequencing; (3) Iran's Strait of Hormuz management; (4) proxy disarmament demands; and (5) domestic political constraints on both sides.
The two-week ceasefire was already showing cracks — Iran launched attacks on Kuwait and UAE after the ceasefire announcement, citing retaliatory strikes on Lavan Island.
The Islamabad negotiations (beginning April 10) were expected to grapple with each of these minefields, with nuclear enrichment considered the hardest to bridge.
Both sides entered negotiations with domestic audiences that expected "victory" — making compromise politically costly.
Nuclear Enrichment: The Core Sticking Point
The central dispute between the US and Iran in any nuclear agreement is enrichment. The NPT (Article IV) grants non-nuclear weapon states the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, which Iran interprets as including enrichment. The US position — especially under Trump — is that Iran should have zero enrichment on its soil. The 2015 JCPOA had capped enrichment at 3.67% but allowed continued domestic enrichment. After US withdrawal in 2018, Iran enriched to 60% by 2021.
Key Details
- Three negotiating positions on enrichment: (a) Iran: full enrichment rights; (b) JCPOA model: limited, monitored enrichment; (c) Trump position: zero enrichment in Iran
- Breakout time with 60% enriched uranium stockpile: weeks to weapons-grade (90%)
- Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (buried underground in Qom): survived US-Israeli strikes
- Iran's enrichment infrastructure: partially destroyed by strikes; some survived
- The enrichment impasse caused collapse of JCPOA revival talks in Vienna (2022–2023)
The first minefield in negotiations is whether the US can accept any residual Iranian enrichment activity — and whether Iran can politically accept the complete surrender of this capability, given its "red line" status in Iranian domestic politics.
Sanctions Architecture: Sequencing and Reversibility
Iran demands comprehensive sanctions removal — both US unilateral sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions — before or simultaneously with any nuclear concessions. The US historically insists on "compliance for compliance" — Iran first demonstrates nuclear rollback, then sanctions are lifted. This sequencing dispute (who moves first?) has been the central technical obstacle in all US-Iran nuclear negotiations since 2009.
Key Details
- US sanctions on Iran: IEEPA-based executive orders; CAATSA (2017); Iran Sanctions Act (1996)
- UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015): endorsed JCPOA; included snapback mechanism (90-day process to reimpose sanctions)
- Snapback used by US in September 2020 (contested)
- SWIFT disconnection: Iranian banks disconnected from SWIFT (implemented 2012); briefly reconnected under JCPOA (2016–2018); disconnected again after US withdrawal
- EU "Blocking Statute": prohibits EU companies from complying with US secondary sanctions
Sanctions sequencing — who moves first — is the second major minefield; Iran's maximalist demand for lifting all UNSC resolutions adds a multilateral dimension that the US alone cannot deliver without UNSC agreement.
Strait of Hormuz: Who Controls It?
A fundamental dispute in the ceasefire transition is the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran insists it will maintain "smart management" of the strait; the US insists on complete, unrestricted, toll-free passage under UNCLOS transit passage principles. This goes to the heart of Iranian sovereignty claims over adjacent waters and Iran's leverage in future negotiations.
Key Details
- Iran's territorial waters in the strait: Iran controls the northern shore; Oman the southern shore
- UNCLOS (to which Iran is not a party): transit passage right is non-suspendable
- Iran's historical argument: its domestic law (non-UNCLOS signatory) permits regulation of transit
- Proposed "toll" by Iran and Oman: unprecedented; creates a commercial barrier to what has been toll-free transit
- US red line: "complete, immediate, safe opening without limitation, including tolls"
Iran retaining Hormuz leverage — even after a nuclear deal — directly conflicts with the US position of toll-free unrestricted transit, making this the third minefield in the ceasefire-to-deal pathway.
Proxy Disarmament: Iran's Regional Footprint
The US-Israel campaign also targeted Iran's support for its regional proxy network. Any comprehensive deal would need to address: Hezbollah's weapons arsenal; Houthi operations in Yemen and the Red Sea; and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. Iran views these groups as legitimate "resistance" movements; the US and Israel see them as terrorist organisations requiring disarmament.
Key Details
- Hezbollah: designated Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by US (1997); armed by Iran via Syria
- Houthis: designated FTO by Trump administration (re-designated 2025)
- Iran-Iraq militias: Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF); some factions designated as terrorists
- Iran's position: proxy support is "resistance" — non-negotiable
- US-Israel position: Iran must cease financing, arming, training proxy groups
The fourth minefield — proxy disarmament — mirrors disputes in Lebanon ceasefires: regional actors are harder to demobilise than state actors, and Iran will resist concessions that weaken its strategic depth.
- JCPOA enrichment cap: 3.67% U-235 (2015)
- Iran's enrichment by 2025: ~60% U-235
- UNSC Resolution 2231: adopted July 20, 2015
- SWIFT disconnected from Iran: 2012; briefly reconnected 2016; disconnected again 2018
- US-Iran ceasefire: April 7–8, 2026 (2 weeks)
- Islamabad negotiations: April 10, 2026
- Hezbollah FTO designation by US: 1997
- Houthi Red Sea attacks: began November 2023