20 TMC rebel MPs get Lok Sabha notices over anti-defection pleas, 7-day deadline
The Lok Sabha Secretariat issued notices to 20 Members of Parliament under the Members of Lok Sabha (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1985, directing them to respond within seven days to a disqualification petition filed against them.
The notices followed a Supreme Court direction seeking an expeditious decision on disqualification petitions that had been filed in June 2026 under Rule 6 of the 1985 Rules.
The petitions allege that the 20 MPs, elected on one party's ticket, subsequently associated themselves with another political outfit — conduct that can attract disqualification under the Tenth Schedule's provision on voluntarily giving up party membership.
A Supreme Court bench sought responses from the 20 MPs on a separate plea challenging the delay in the Speaker's decision-making on the pending petitions, reiterating that questions of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule must be decided by the House's Presiding Officer.
The Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law)
The Tenth Schedule was inserted into the Constitution by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, to check political defections driven by considerations of office or material benefit. It applies to members of Parliament and state legislatures and lays down grounds on which an elected member can be disqualified for defection.
Key Details
- Enacted in 1985 under the government of the time; came into force from 1 March 1985 and is given effect through Article 102(2) (Parliament) and Article 191(2) (state legislatures).
- Grounds for disqualification include: voluntarily giving up membership of the political party on whose ticket a member was elected [paragraph 2(1)(a)], and voting or abstaining contrary to a party whip without prior permission and without condonation within 15 days [paragraph 2(1)(b)].
- The 91st Amendment Act, 2003 removed the earlier exception that protected a "split" of one-third of a party's legislators from disqualification, and capped the size of the Council of Ministers.
- A merger is protected only if at least two-thirds of the members of a legislature party agree to it [paragraph 4].
The petitions against the 20 MPs rest on the "voluntary giving up of membership" ground under paragraph 2(1)(a) — one of the two core disqualification triggers under the Tenth Schedule, applicable regardless of which parties are involved.
Speaker as Adjudicating Authority and the Kihoto Hollohan Doctrine
Under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule, the question of whether a member has incurred disqualification for defection is decided by the Chairman or Speaker of the House concerned, acting as a tribunal. This quasi-judicial role was tested and clarified in landmark Supreme Court rulings.
Key Details
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — a Constitution Bench upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule but struck down paragraph 7 (which sought to bar judicial review of the Speaker's decision) as it required ratification by state legislatures under Article 368(2), which had not occurred. The Court held the Speaker's decision is subject to judicial review on limited grounds (mala fide, perversity, violation of natural justice).
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020) — the Supreme Court directed that, absent extraordinary circumstances, Speakers should decide disqualification petitions within three months, and recommended that Parliament consider replacing the Speaker with an independent tribunal for adjudicating such petitions.
- Procedurally, disqualification petitions are filed under Rule 6, and the member proceeded against must be given an opportunity to submit a reply — typically within seven days — under Rule 7(3) of the Members of Lok Sabha (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1985 (in force since 18 March 1986).
The seven-day reply window given to the 20 MPs follows the standard Rule 7(3) procedure, while the Supreme Court's parallel intervention on delay echoes the concerns first flagged in Keisham Meghachandra Singh about Speakers sitting on disqualification petitions for extended periods.
Judicial Review of Speaker's Decisions vs Removal of the Speaker
It is useful to distinguish the Speaker's quasi-judicial role under the Tenth Schedule from the separate constitutional process for the Speaker's own removal, since both involve the Lok Sabha's presiding officer but rest on different provisions.
Key Details
- Article 94(c) provides that the Speaker may be removed by a resolution of the Lok Sabha passed by a majority of all the then members of the House (an effective majority), with 14 days' advance notice required.
- The Tenth Schedule adjudication (paragraph 6) is a distinct quasi-judicial function of the sitting Speaker over individual members' disqualification, not a question of the Speaker's own tenure.
- Because the Speaker (who may belong to a party) decides disqualification cases involving members of various parties, the perceived conflict of interest was central to the Keisham Meghachandra Singh recommendation for an independent tribunal.
The case again places the Speaker's dual role — as House functionary and as Tenth Schedule tribunal — under scrutiny, reviving the long-pending debate on whether disqualification adjudication should shift to an independent body.
- 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act: 1985; inserted the Tenth Schedule.
- 91st Constitutional Amendment Act: 2003; ended protection for one-third "splits."
- Merger protection threshold: two-thirds of legislature party members [paragraph 4].
- Reply deadline for MPs under Rule 7(3): 7 days.
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu: 1992, Constitution Bench ruling.
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur: 2020, recommended 3-month decision timeline.
- Whip-defiance condonation window: 15 days [paragraph 2(1)(b)].