Abhishek Banerjee seeks SC direction on disqualification of 20 TMC MPs
A plea was filed before the Supreme Court seeking a time-bound direction to the Lok Sabha Speaker on pending disqualification petitions concerning a group of Members of Parliament under the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law)
The disqualification petitions relate to MPs who are alleged to have aligned with a different political outfit after being elected on another party's ticket
The plea challenges the alleged delay by the Speaker in deciding the pending disqualification proceedings and seeks a court-ordered timeline for a decision
The Supreme Court has listed the matter for hearing before a bench of the Chief Justice of India on 25 August
The Tenth Schedule — Anti-Defection Law (Articles 102(2) and 191(2))
The Tenth Schedule was inserted into the Constitution by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, to curb political defections by elected legislators. It applies to disqualification of Members of Parliament under Article 102(2) and Members of State Legislatures under Article 191(2).
Key Details
- Inserted by: 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 (in force from 1 March 1985)
- Amended Articles: 101, 102, 190 and 191 (vacation of seats and disqualification)
- Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule: a member is disqualified if they "voluntarily give up" membership of the party on whose ticket they were elected — this is broader than formal resignation and can be inferred from conduct
- Paragraph 6: the question of disqualification is decided by the Speaker/Chairman of the House, whose decision was originally intended to be final
The pending petitions concern precisely this "voluntarily giving up membership" test — whether the conduct of the MPs concerned (aligning with another political outfit) amounts to defection under Paragraph 2(1)(a), a determination that falls to the Speaker under Paragraph 6.
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — Judicial Review of the Speaker's Decision
In this landmark case, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule but struck down Paragraph 7, which had sought to bar judicial review of the Speaker's decisions on disqualification.
Key Details
- Decided: 1992, by a 3:2 majority
- Held: the Speaker acts as a quasi-judicial tribunal while deciding disqualification, and such decisions are subject to judicial review by constitutional courts on limited grounds — mala fides, perversity, violation of constitutional mandate, or breach of natural justice
- Paragraph 7 (ousting judicial review) was declared unconstitutional as it required ratification by states under Article 368(2), which had not been obtained
It is this ruling that gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain a plea challenging the Speaker's delay, since Speaker inaction/delay in disqualification matters is itself judicially reviewable.
Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020) — Timeline for Speaker's Decision
This 2020 Supreme Court ruling directly addressed the problem of Speakers indefinitely delaying disqualification decisions, which had allowed defecting members to continue in office (and sometimes hold ministerial posts) for years without a ruling.
Key Details
- Held: absent exceptional circumstances, the Speaker should decide a disqualification petition within three months of it being filed
- The Court also recommended Parliament consider replacing the Speaker (a political office-holder) with an independent tribunal, headed by a retired judge, to decide Tenth Schedule matters — a recommendation not yet implemented
- Reaffirmed that constitutional courts can issue directions to the Speaker where there is unreasonable delay, without deciding the disqualification question itself
A plea seeking a time-bound direction to the Speaker on long-pending disqualification petitions falls squarely within the precedent set by this case, which established the three-month benchmark and the courts' power to compel a decision (though not to decide the merits directly, absent exceptional circumstances).
Comparable Constitutional Removal/Disqualification Mechanisms
Disqualification under the Tenth Schedule should be distinguished from other constitutional mechanisms for removing legislators or presiding officers, a common source of UPSC prelims confusion.
Key Details
- Speaker's own removal: Article 94 — by a resolution passed by a majority of all then members of the Lok Sabha (an "effective majority"), after 14 days' notice
- Rajya Sabha Chairman's removal: Article 67(b) — by a resolution passed by a majority of all then members of the Rajya Sabha and agreed to by the Lok Sabha
- Tenth Schedule disqualification: decided by the Speaker/Chairman themselves (not the House), subject to judicial review — a quasi-judicial, not a legislative, process
- Disqualification under Article 102(1)/191(1) (e.g., holding an office of profit, unsound mind, insolvency) is separate from Tenth Schedule defection disqualification and is decided by the President/Governor on the Election Commission's opinion
The matter at hand concerns Tenth Schedule disqualification (Speaker-decided, judicially reviewable for delay) rather than a no-confidence motion or the Speaker's own removal, a distinction UPSC frequently tests.
- 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act: 1985 — inserted the Tenth Schedule
- Tenth Schedule governs Articles 102(2) (MPs) and 191(2) (MLAs)
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu: 1992 — upheld Tenth Schedule; struck down Paragraph 7 (ouster of judicial review)
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur: 2020 — Speaker should decide disqualification petitions within 3 months
- Speaker's own removal (Article 94): requires an effective majority resolution with 14 days' notice
- Rajya Sabha Chairman's removal (Article 67(b)): requires Rajya Sabha majority resolution agreed to by Lok Sabha
- The matter is listed for hearing before a Supreme Court bench headed by the Chief Justice of India on 25 August