Supreme Court lauds scrapped MGNREGA as a ‘good, effective scheme’
A three-judge Supreme Court Bench, headed by the Chief Justice of India, described the now-repealed Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) as a "good, effective scheme," stating it was neither a freebie nor a means of exploiting rural workers
The observation came while hearing a petition on delayed wage payments under the scheme, filed by social activist Aruna Roy
The petition also seeks a judicial declaration elevating the right to work to the status of a fundamental right
The Bench questioned whether a statutory employment guarantee can be placed on the same constitutional footing as the fundamental right to life and dignity under Article 21
The matter arises against the backdrop of MGNREGA's repeal and replacement by a new rural employment law effective 1 July 2026, which has generated disputes over pending wage claims from the transition period
Article 41 — Right to Work as a Directive Principle of State Policy
Article 41, located in Part IV of the Constitution, directs the State, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, to make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education, and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness, and disablement. Directive Principles are declared "fundamental in the governance of the country" under Article 37 but are explicitly non-justiciable — no court can compel their enforcement.
Key Details
- Article 41 falls under Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy), Articles 36-51
- Article 37 states DPSPs "shall not be enforceable by any court," distinguishing them from Fundamental Rights (Part III), which are justiciable under Article 32
- MGNREGA (2005) was widely regarded as the first major Indian statute translating the Article 41 right-to-work aspiration into a legally enforceable, demand-driven entitlement — 100 days of guaranteed wage employment per rural household per financial year
- The original MGNREGA included an unemployment allowance clause: if work was not provided within 15 days of a demand, the state was liable to pay an unemployment allowance
The petition's core ask — recognising the right to work as a fundamental right — would effectively convert an Article 41 directive principle into an Article 32-enforceable right, which is precisely the constitutional boundary the Bench probed when questioning the equivalence with Article 21.
Article 21 and the Judicially Read-In Right to Livelihood
Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), the Supreme Court held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, since deprivation of livelihood would leave a person without the means to live and thus amount to deprivation of life.
Key Details
- Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 — a five-judge Bench held that eviction of pavement dwellers without following fair procedure violated their right to livelihood under Article 21
- This judgment established that Article 21's protection extends beyond mere physical existence to include the means of sustaining life, but stopped short of creating an affirmative state obligation to provide employment
- The pending petition seeks to go further than Olga Tellis — from a negative protection against arbitrary deprivation of livelihood, to a positive, enforceable guarantee of work itself
The Bench's questioning reflects this precise distinction — whether extending Article 21 to cover a right against arbitrary deprivation of livelihood (as in Olga Tellis) can be stretched further into a positive, court-enforceable right to be provided work, which the Constitution's framers placed only among the non-justiciable Directive Principles.
From MGNREGA (2005) to the New Rural Employment Law — a shift in legal character
MGNREGA operated for roughly two decades as a demand-driven legal entitlement enforceable through Gram Panchayats, with open-ended central funding tied to actual demand for work. It has now been repealed and replaced by a new rural employment law, effective 1 July 2026, that retains a wage-employment guarantee but restructures its funding and legal architecture.
Key Details
- MGNREGA, 2005 guaranteed 100 days of wage employment per rural household per financial year, funded on a demand-driven basis with the Centre bearing the bulk of wage costs
- The new law, effective from 1 July 2026, raises the guaranteed employment days from 100 to 125 per household per year
- Funding mechanism changed: the Centre now fixes an annual spending ceiling for each state; expenditure beyond that ceiling must be borne by the state government itself, replacing MGNREGA's open-ended demand-driven Central funding
- The new law introduces digitised attendance tracking and local "Janata Boards" for community-level monitoring of works
- Several state governments have raised objections to the funding-ceiling model on federalism grounds, and litigation (including the wage-arrears petition before the Court) has followed from the transition
The wage-arrears petition being heard by the Court arises directly from this legislative transition — dues that accrued under the old demand-driven MGNREGA framework remain unpaid even as the scheme itself has been repealed, prompting the broader constitutional question about whether such entitlements should be insulated from legislative change by fundamental-right status.
- MGNREGA enacted: 2005; in force for approximately two decades before repeal
- New rural employment law replaces MGNREGA effective: 1 July 2026
- Guaranteed employment days: 100 (under MGNREGA) raised to 125 (under the new law)
- Petition filed by: social activist Aruna Roy, seeking release of pending wages and recognition of right to work as a fundamental right
- Constitutional provisions in play: Article 41 (DPSP, right to work, non-justiciable under Article 37) and Article 21 (right to life, judicially extended to livelihood)
- Landmark precedent cited: Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545
- Bench: three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, headed by the Chief Justice of India