← Resources · August 13, 2026
Polity & Governance GS2 5 min read

Justice Yashwant Varma inquiry: What the panel found and what happens next? | Explained

What happened
01

A three-member in-house inquiry committee, set up under the Judges (Inquiry) Act framework and headed by a sitting Supreme Court judge, concluded that all charges levelled against the concerned High Court judge stood "proved."

02

The panel held that the judge failed to furnish a satisfactory explanation for the large quantity of cash recovered from his official residence after a fire incident, and found that material evidence had been interfered with.

03

The inquiry report was tabled in both Houses of Parliament by the Secretaries General of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.

04

The judge has since resigned, which raises a procedural question on whether the removal (impeachment) process can still continue, since a resignation is not "subject to acceptance" by the President and is deemed effective once tendered and made public.

05

Officials have argued the removal process can proceed regardless, since the underlying proceedings had commenced before the resignation.

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Constitutional Removal of Judges — Articles 124(4), 124(5) and 218

Article 124(4) lays down that a Supreme Court judge can be removed only by an order of the President, issued after an address by each House of Parliament in the same session, supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and a majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting, on the ground of "proved misbehaviour or incapacity." Article 218 extends the same protections and removal process to High Court judges. Article 124(5) empowers Parliament to legislate the procedure for investigation and proof of the charges, which it did through the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

Key Details

  • Removal requires both: (i) majority of total membership of the House, and (ii) two-thirds majority of members present and voting — a "special majority," distinct from a simple majority.
  • Motion for removal needs a minimum of 100 Lok Sabha MPs' or 50 Rajya Sabha MPs' signatures to be admitted by the Speaker/Chairman.
  • Once admitted, a three-member committee (a Supreme Court judge, a Chief Justice of a High Court, and a distinguished jurist) is constituted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 to investigate the charges (Articles of Charge).
  • If the committee finds the judge guilty, the motion is taken up for debate and voting in both Houses in the same session; only after passage in both Houses does the President issue the removal order.
  • The ground for removal is "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" — a phrase the Constitution deliberately leaves undefined, allowing case-by-case judicial interpretation.
Connection to this news

The in-house committee's finding that all charges stand "proved" mirrors the first evidentiary stage of the Article 124(4)/218 process — the constitution of a fact-finding committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act — though this was preceded by the judiciary's own informal "in-house procedure," a separate self-regulatory mechanism.

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In-House Procedure for Judicial Accountability

The "in-house procedure" is a self-regulatory mechanism evolved by the judiciary itself (not a statute) to examine complaints of misbehaviour against sitting judges before resorting to the formal constitutional removal process. It allows the Chief Justice to seek an explanation, and if warranted, ask the judge to resign or face further action, including recommending a formal removal process to the President.

Key Details

  • The mechanism traces its judicial basis to C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee (1995) 5 SCC 457, where the Supreme Court held that judicial independence must be protected from public pressure to resign, while also recognizing the need for a mechanism of internal judicial accountability.
  • K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991) established that a judge can be investigated for criminal misconduct only with the prior consultation/permission of the Chief Justice of India, reinforcing judicial primacy in matters of judicial accountability.
  • The in-house procedure is distinct from, and precedes, the constitutional impeachment process under Article 124(4)/218 — it has no direct statutory backing but has been consistently invoked by the CJI since the early 1990s.
  • Justice V. Ramaswami's case (1991-93) was the first attempt at removal of a Supreme Court judge in independent India; the Lok Sabha motion failed to secure the required special majority.
Connection to this news

The in-house committee that examined the judge's conduct in this case operated under this judicially evolved self-regulatory mechanism before any formal Article 124(4) motion was moved in Parliament, illustrating the two-track (informal in-house, then formal constitutional) nature of judicial accountability in India.

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Effect of Resignation on Pending Removal Proceedings

A judge's resignation, once tendered to the President and made public, takes immediate effect and is not subject to presidential acceptance — unlike resignation of some other constitutional functionaries. This raises a live constitutional question on whether removal (impeachment) proceedings already initiated in Parliament can continue after a judge has ceased to hold office.

Key Details

  • Article 124(2)'s proviso allows a Supreme Court/High Court judge to resign by writing to the President; the office falls vacant on that date, without needing formal acceptance.
  • There is no explicit constitutional provision on whether an admitted motion for removal can proceed to conclusion after resignation — this is a debated/unsettled area, since the object of removal (disqualification from judicial office and consequential effects) may become moot once the person is no longer a judge.
  • Legal opinion is divided: some argue that continuing the inquiry has value for record and potential future implications (e.g., interim orders, or informing appointment to constitutional posts); others argue removal proceedings become infructuous once resignation takes effect.
Connection to this news

This is the crux of the "what happens next" question — whether Parliament can and will continue with the formal removal motion despite the judge's resignation, given that the underlying committee proceedings predate the resignation.

Key facts & data
  • Special majority for judge removal: majority of total membership of the House and two-thirds of members present and voting (Article 124(4)/218).
  • Minimum signatures to admit a removal motion: 100 MPs (Lok Sabha) or 50 MPs (Rajya Sabha).
  • Statutory basis for the inquiry committee: Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, enacted under Article 124(5).
  • Inquiry committee composition: one Supreme Court judge, one High Court Chief Justice, one eminent jurist.
  • Landmark cases: K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991); C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee (1995) 5 SCC 457.
  • First removal attempt in independent India: Justice V. Ramaswami (1991-93) — motion failed in Lok Sabha for want of special majority.
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