Is Yashwant Varma still a judge?
A three-member in-house inquiry committee, constituted after unaccounted cash was found at the official residence of a Delhi High Court judge in March 2025, found sufficient substance to recommend proceedings for removal
A separate parliamentary inquiry committee, formed under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 after a removal motion signed by over 100 Lok Sabha members, has submitted its report to the Lok Sabha Speaker
The judge concerned resigned in April 2026, before the parliamentary process concluded
The report is now expected to come up before Parliament, reopening the question of whether a resignation can halt or nullify an ongoing removal process against a judge
Constitutional Removal of Judges — Articles 124(4) and 217
Article 124(4) provides that a Supreme Court judge can be removed only by an order of the President, issued after an address by each House of Parliament in the same session, supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and a majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting (a "special majority"). The ground for removal is "proved misbehaviour or incapacity." Article 217(1) proviso (b) applies the same procedure to High Court judges by cross-reference to Article 124(4).
Key Details
- Article 124(5) empowers Parliament to legislate the procedure for the address and investigation, which it did through the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
- Removal requires a statutory investigation committee of three members: a sitting Supreme Court judge, a Chief Justice of a High Court, and a distinguished jurist
- No judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court has ever been removed through this process to date; motions have lapsed or judges have resigned before completion (e.g., Justice Soumitra Sen resigned in 2011 before the Lok Sabha could vote on a Rajya Sabha-passed removal motion)
The Varma case follows the same constitutional track — an in-house committee's adverse finding triggered a Lok Sabha motion and a statutory inquiry committee under the 1968 Act, which is the only route the Constitution recognises for removing a sitting High Court or Supreme Court judge.
The "In-House Procedure" (1997) vs the Statutory Removal Process
The in-house procedure is an internal, non-statutory mechanism the higher judiciary adopted for itself, distinct from the constitutional removal process. A Supreme Court committee framed it in October 1997 and it was adopted, with amendments, at a full-court meeting in December 1999, following judicial concern after cases like the K. Veeraswami matter about accountability gaps for sitting judges.
Key Details
- Under the in-house procedure, a fact-finding committee (typically two Chief Justices and one High Court judge, or three sitting judges for a Supreme Court case) inquires into complaints of misconduct
- It has no statutory backing, no power to administer oaths, and no provision for cross-examination or legal representation — its findings are only recommendatory to the Chief Justice of India
- Its harshest outcome is a recommendation to the judge to resign or seek voluntary retirement, or, if that fails, a recommendation to the President/Prime Minister to initiate the constitutional removal process
- This is the process that examined the March 2025 cash discovery before the matter moved to the formal Lok Sabha motion
The in-house committee's report is what triggered the formal parliamentary process; the current dispute is about whether the judge's resignation — tendered under Article 217(1) proviso (a), which lets a judge resign by writing to the President without needing acceptance — can terminate the process once a statutory inquiry committee has already been constituted.
Resignation of a Judge — Article 217(1) Proviso (a)
A High Court judge may resign at any time by writing under their own hand addressed to the President; a Supreme Court judge has an equivalent right under Article 124(2) proviso (a). Constitutionally, this resignation takes effect from the date specified by the judge and does not require the President's acceptance — it is a unilateral act.
Key Details
- The provision exists to preserve judicial independence: a judge should be able to leave office freely, without being at the mercy of the executive's discretion to "accept" or withhold acceptance
- Historically, resignation before a Lok Sabha vote has been treated as ending removal proceedings, since a resigned judge is no longer "in office" for Parliament to remove
- Critics argue this creates an accountability gap: a judge facing likely removal can resign, retain post-retirement benefits and pension, and avoid the stigma and consequences of a formal "removed for misbehaviour" finding
- The present controversy — tabling the report despite the resignation — tests whether Parliament can still record findings or the taint of misbehaviour once the individual is no longer a sitting judge
This is precisely the constitutional question raised by the Varma matter: resignation ends the person's tenure as a judge, but whether it also extinguishes an already-initiated statutory inquiry (and its consequences, such as a formal parliamentary finding of misbehaviour) is untested and now before Parliament.
- Cash discovery at the judge's official residence: March 14, 2025 (Delhi)
- Judges (Inquiry) Act enacted: 1968
- In-house procedure adopted by full court: December 1999 (drafted 1997)
- Removal requires: majority of total House membership + two-thirds of members present and voting, in both Houses, in the same session
- Constitutional basis: Article 124(4) (Supreme Court), Article 217(1) proviso (b) (High Court)
- No judge has ever been removed via this process in India's constitutional history to date