'Resigned judge' can't be impeached, say constitutional experts
Parliament tabled an inquiry committee report on the proposed removal of a sitting High Court judge who had faced allegations of unaccounted cash found at his official residence during a fire incident in March 2025.
The judge resigned from his position at the Allahabad High Court in April 2026, submitting his resignation to the President.
Constitutional experts have stated that impeachment proceedings are rendered ineffective once a judge resigns, since removal can only apply to a person "holding office" — and resignation terminates that status immediately, without requiring acceptance.
The tabling of the inquiry report is now considered a parliamentary formality with no operative legal consequence.
Impeachment of Judges: Articles 124, 217, and 218
The Indian Constitution does not use the word "impeachment" for judges — the term is colloquially applied to the removal procedure under Articles 124(4) and 124(5). Article 124(4) provides that a Supreme Court judge shall not be removed except by an order of the President, passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by: (a) a majority of the total membership of that House, and (b) a majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting. Article 218 extends these identical provisions to High Court judges. Article 217 further governs the appointment and conditions of service of High Court judges.
Key Details
- Grounds for removal: "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" only — not mere allegations.
- The motion must be signed by at least 100 Lok Sabha members or 50 Rajya Sabha members for the presiding officer to admit it.
- A three-member inquiry committee is constituted: one Supreme Court judge, one High Court Chief Justice, and one eminent jurist.
- No judge has been successfully removed from office in India's constitutional history. Justice V. Ramaswami (1993) survived an impeachment vote because the ruling party's members abstained; Justice Soumitra Sen (Calcutta HC, 2011) resigned before a Rajya Sabha vote was completed.
The judge's resignation before the completion of inquiry proceedings highlights the same structural gap: once the officeholder resigns, there is no "office" left to deprive them of, making the constitutional removal machinery operationally moot.
The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 operationalises the constitutional provisions for judicial removal. It lays down the detailed procedure: admission of a removal motion by the Speaker or Chairman, constitution of a three-member investigation committee, examination of evidence, and presentation of findings to Parliament. If the committee finds the judge guilty of misbehaviour or incapacity, both Houses must still pass the address by the required majorities.
Key Details
- The Act was enacted under the enabling power in Article 124(5), which authorises Parliament to regulate the removal procedure by law.
- Crucially, the Act does not contain any provision for proceeding against a resigned judge — it applies only to "a judge" who holds office.
- Under Article 124(4), the President issues the removal order only "after an address by each House" — if both the address and office holding are absent, the President has nothing to act upon.
The inquiry committee report, though formally tabled in Parliament, cannot produce any legal consequence because the subject of the inquiry is no longer a judge — the statutory mechanism applies only to sitting judges.
Judicial Independence vs. Accountability: The Constitutional Design
The founding rationale for the stringent removal procedure was to insulate judges from executive or legislative pressure, ensuring they decide cases without fear of removal for unpopular judgments. The framers deliberately raised the bar high. A corollary, however, is that the same insulation creates accountability gaps: a judge facing serious misconduct charges can effectively exit the process by resigning, retaining pension and retirement benefits.
Key Details
- The In-House Procedure (established by the Supreme Court, 1999) allows peer-based inquiry of judges but has no statutory backing and cannot impose punishments.
- The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014, was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015 (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India) for violating judicial independence — showing how tightly the judiciary guards its institutional autonomy.
- Several Law Commission reports and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission have flagged the need for a statutory judicial accountability mechanism to address post-resignation impunity.
The episode reinforces longstanding calls for a statutory Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill (a 2010 draft has never been enacted) that would allow inquiry outcomes to affect post-retirement benefits even after resignation.
- Articles 124(4) and 124(5) govern Supreme Court judge removal; Article 218 extends these to High Courts.
- Minimum signatures required: 100 Lok Sabha members or 50 Rajya Sabha members to initiate.
- Required voting threshold: absolute majority of total House membership AND two-thirds of members present and voting.
- Three-member inquiry committee: one Supreme Court judge + one High Court Chief Justice + one eminent jurist.
- No judge has been removed from office in India's post-independence history (over 75 years).
- The Judges (Inquiry) Act was enacted in 1968.
- Justice Soumitra Sen (Calcutta HC) resigned in 2011 before a Rajya Sabha vote; Justice C.S. Karnan was the first HC judge convicted of contempt (2017) — serving judges can be held in contempt but the removal route is separate.