Will strongly oppose Bill to sack ministers in custody for 30 days over serious offences: Congress
The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill proposes the automatic dismissal of the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, and other ministers if they remain in judicial custody for 30 consecutive days in cases involving offences punishable by imprisonment of five years or more.
The Bill was introduced in August 2025 and subsequently referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) for detailed examination.
The JPC is expected to adopt its report on or around July 17, 2026, and table it in the Lok Sabha when the Monsoon Session commences on July 20, 2026.
Multiple opposition parties have stayed away from the JPC proceedings, contending that the Bill violates the fundamental legal principle that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
A formal constitutional amendment requires a special majority — a two-thirds majority of members present and voting in each House of Parliament, provided this constitutes more than half the total membership of that House (Article 368).
Constitutional Amendment Procedure — Article 368
Article 368 of the Constitution governs the amendment procedure. It distinguishes between: (a) amendments that require only a simple majority (ordinary legislation — e.g., creation of new states under Article 3); (b) amendments that require a special majority — two-thirds of members present and voting, provided it forms a majority of the total House membership; and (c) amendments under the "special entrenchment" category that additionally require ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures (e.g., changes to federal provisions such as distribution of legislative powers, representation of states in Parliament). The 130th Amendment Bill, which amends provisions about executive accountability, falls under category (b): special majority in both Houses, but no state ratification requirement.
Key Details
- Article 368: Parliament's power to amend the Constitution.
- Special majority: two-thirds of members present and voting AND more than half the total membership of the House.
- State ratification required for: changes to Articles 54, 55, 73, 162, Articles 241, Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, Chapter I of Part XI, Seventh Schedule lists, representation of states in Parliament, and Article 368 itself.
- The Bill requires a special majority but not state ratification, since it concerns executive appointment/removal, not federal distribution of powers.
Opposition parties have argued that the government lacks the two-thirds majority required for the amendment's passage — making the bill's fate contingent on floor management in both Houses.
Article 75 and Article 164 — Ministers' Tenure and Pleasure Doctrine
At the Centre, Article 75(1) provides that the Prime Minister is appointed by the President, and other Ministers are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. Under Article 75(2), Ministers "hold office during the pleasure of the President" — meaning, in constitutional practice, they serve as long as they command the confidence of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers retains the confidence of the Lok Sabha. At the state level, Article 164 provides the equivalent: Ministers are appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister and hold office during the Governor's pleasure. Currently, no constitutional provision mandates automatic removal of a minister upon arrest or judicial custody — removal is purely discretionary and convention-based. The proposed Bill seeks to make dismissal automatic and time-bound.
Key Details
- Article 75(2): Central Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the President.
- Article 164(1): State Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor.
- Article 75(3) / Article 164(2): Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the House of the People / State Legislative Assembly.
- Currently: no constitutional bar on a minister continuing in office while in judicial custody.
- Proposed change: automatic dismissal on Day 31 of continuous custody in a case with potential sentence of 5+ years.
The Bill inserts a new constitutional disqualification trigger — prolonged judicial custody — that does not currently exist in either Article 75 or Article 164, making this a significant structural addition to the tenure provisions.
Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) — Role and Procedure
A Joint Parliamentary Committee is a special committee of both Houses of Parliament constituted for a specific purpose — typically to examine a significant or contested Bill, or to investigate a specific matter. A JPC is constituted by a motion passed in one House and concurred by the other. It includes members from both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in a ratio roughly proportional to party strength. The JPC examines the Bill clause-by-clause, may call expert witnesses and ministers, and submits a report to Parliament. The report's adoption by Parliament does not automatically pass the Bill — the Bill must still be debated and voted upon in each House.
Key Details
- JPC: ad-hoc committee; constituted by motion; members from both Houses.
- Differs from Standing Committees: Standing Committees are permanent; JPCs are constituted for specific Bills or investigations.
- JPC on the 130th Amendment Bill: expected to adopt its report around July 17, 2026.
- Report tabling: Monsoon Session of Parliament, beginning July 20, 2026.
- Examples of previous JPCs: JPC on the Companies Amendment Bill; JPC on the Securities Scam (1992); JPC on the 2G spectrum (2011).
The JPC process has been used here to build cross-party deliberation around a constitutionally significant Bill — though several opposition parties have boycotted it, potentially affecting the report's legitimacy.
Presumption of Innocence — Constitutional and International Framework
The presumption of innocence — that an accused person is innocent until proven guilty — is a foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence recognised under Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) of the Constitution and is implicit in the principles of natural justice. Internationally, it is enshrined in Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) and Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), to which India is a party. The proposed Bill's critics argue that automatic dismissal upon custody — before conviction — effectively punishes an office-holder before guilt is established, creating a constitutional tension with Article 21.
Key Details
- Article 21, Constitution of India: right to life and personal liberty; interpreted to include fair procedure.
- UDHR Article 11 and ICCPR Article 14(2): international codification of presumption of innocence.
- Existing law: Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 disqualifies elected members on conviction (not mere arrest) for specified offences.
- The proposed Bill targets ministers specifically (not all legislators) and triggers on custody duration, not conviction.
The opposition's core legal argument — that the Bill presumes guilt before proof — draws directly on Article 21 and the well-established principle that conviction (not arrest or custody) is the constitutionally permissible trigger for deprivation of a public office.
- Bill name: Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill.
- Proposal: automatic dismissal of PM, CMs, and ministers upon 30+ consecutive days in judicial custody for offences carrying 5+ year imprisonment.
- Introduced: August 2025; referred to JPC.
- JPC report adoption: expected around July 17, 2026.
- Monsoon Session start: July 20, 2026.
- Special majority required: Article 368 — two-thirds of members present and voting, provided it is a majority of total House membership.
- Article 75(2): Central Ministers hold office during pleasure of the President.
- Article 164(1): State Ministers hold office during pleasure of the Governor.
- Representation of the People Act, 1951 Section 8: existing disqualification on conviction (not mere arrest).
- UDHR Article 11 and ICCPR Article 14(2): presumption of innocence in international law.