Speaker Birla to decide on TMC, Sena (UBT) defections before Monsoon Session

The Lok Sabha Speaker is examining disqualification petitions against MPs who have broken away from their parent parties — twenty of a major regional party's...

What Happened

The Lok Sabha Speaker is examining disqualification petitions against MPs who have broken away from their parent parties — twenty of a major regional party's 28 Lok Sabha MPs have joined a different political grouping, and six of another party's nine Lok Sabha MPs are moving towards a rival faction.
The defecting MPs in one group have invoked the "merger provision" under Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule, claiming protection from disqualification by arguing that their faction constitutes a valid "merger" — the constitutional threshold for merger protection requires at least two-thirds of the legislature party's members.
The parent parties contest the merger claims and have filed formal disqualification petitions with the Speaker, demanding action before the Monsoon Session of Parliament.
Constitutional experts are reviewing previous presiding officer rulings to advise on the legal validity of the "merger" defence under the current facts — particularly whether the defectors meet the two-thirds threshold within the Lok Sabha wing of the party.
There is no statutory deadline by which a Speaker must decide disqualification petitions, though the Supreme Court has held that such petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months.

Static Topic Bridges

Tenth Schedule — Anti-Defection Law

The Tenth Schedule was added to the Constitution of India by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, to curb the problem of legislative defections that had destabilised governments and undermined democratic accountability. It governs disqualification of members of Parliament and state legislatures on grounds of defection.

Constitutional source: Tenth Schedule, read with Articles 102(2) (Lok Sabha/Rajya Sabha) and 191(2) (state legislatures)
Inserted by: 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 (came into force March 18, 1985)
Grounds for disqualification (Paragraph 2): (a) voluntarily giving up membership of the political party; (b) voting or abstaining from voting contrary to party direction without prior permission, and without condonation within 15 days
Exception — merger (Paragraph 4): A member is not disqualified if their legislature party merges with another, provided at least two-thirds of members of the legislature party agree to the merger
No exception for split: The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 removed the earlier "split" exception (which had required one-third of members), leaving only the merger exception

Connection to this news: The defecting MPs are claiming protection under the merger provision (Paragraph 4). Whether the two-thirds threshold is met within the Lok Sabha wing of the respective parties — not the party as a whole — is the key legal question the Speaker must resolve.

Role of the Speaker as Adjudicatory Authority

Under the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker (for Lok Sabha and state Vidhan Sabhas) and the Chairman (for Rajya Sabha and Vidhan Parishads) is the sole adjudicatory authority for deciding disqualification petitions. This makes the presiding officer both a constitutional functionary and a quasi-judicial decision-maker in anti-defection matters.

Adjudicating authority: Speaker of Lok Sabha (Paragraph 6 of Tenth Schedule)
The Speaker's decision is final, though it is subject to judicial review under Article 136 (Special Leave Petition) — as settled in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)
In Kihoto Hollohan (1992), the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Schedule but struck down Paragraph 7, which had barred judicial review, as unconstitutional
Supreme Court guidance on timelines: Disqualification petitions should ordinarily be resolved within three months; no statutory deadline exists

Connection to this news: The Speaker's role here is constitutionally significant — a decision before the Monsoon Session would have immediate consequences for party strength, committee compositions, and potential floor tests. Delay itself carries political and legal implications, as the Supreme Court has criticised inordinate delays in anti-defection matters.

91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003

The 91st Amendment strengthened the anti-defection framework by removing the "split" exception and adding provisions restricting the size of the Council of Ministers.

Amendment: 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003
Changes made: (a) Removed the split provision from the Tenth Schedule (earlier Paragraph 3 protected one-third breakaways); (b) Added Article 75(1A) capping the Council of Ministers at 15% of Lok Sabha strength; (c) Defectors who are disqualified cannot be appointed as ministers until re-elected
Effect: Post-2003, the only protection from disqualification for legislative breaks is a "merger" (two-thirds threshold) — a split of any size no longer protects members

Connection to this news: The removal of the split exception means that any MP who voluntarily gives up party membership or votes against the party whip without meeting the two-thirds merger threshold faces mandatory disqualification — no minimum number short of two-thirds provides protection. This makes the two-thirds count in these cases constitutionally determinative.

Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — Judicial Review of Anti-Defection Decisions

The Supreme Court's 1992 Constitution Bench judgment is the landmark ruling on the scope and limits of the Tenth Schedule and the Speaker's powers under it.

Case: Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others (1992)
Court: Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench)
Key holdings: (a) The Tenth Schedule is constitutionally valid; (b) Paragraph 7 (which barred courts from reviewing the Speaker's decision) was struck down as it required ratification by state legislatures under Article 368(2); (c) The Speaker's decision is subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, perversity, or violation of constitutional provisions
Practical significance: Courts intervene only after the Speaker decides — interim stays are generally not granted during pendency

Connection to this news: Even if the Speaker rules against the defecting MPs, judicial review remains available — but courts follow a deferential standard and will not substitute their discretion for the Speaker's on factual questions of "voluntary giving up of membership."

Key Facts & Data

Tenth Schedule inserted by: 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 (in force from March 18, 1985)
Articles in Constitution relating to Tenth Schedule: Articles 102(2) and 191(2)
Grounds for disqualification: Paragraph 2 (voluntary quit or anti-party vote); Merger exception: Paragraph 4
Two-thirds threshold for merger: Required within the legislature party (not the party as a whole)
Split exception removed by: 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003
Post-2003: Defectors disqualified under Tenth Schedule cannot be appointed ministers until re-elected
15% cap on Council of Ministers: Article 75(1A) — also inserted by 91st Amendment
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992): Upheld Tenth Schedule; struck down Paragraph 7 (which barred judicial review)
Speaker's recommended timeline for deciding disqualification petitions: Three months (Supreme Court guidance; no statutory deadline)
Tenth Schedule comprises: 8 Paragraphs
Paragraph 6: Speaker/Chairman as adjudicating authority
Paragraph 7: Struck down in Kihoto Hollohan as unconstitutional (required state ratification)