← Resources · September 25, 2026
International Relations GS2GS3 6 min read

India left more exposed to Trump's 100% oil threat as China gets tariff breather

What happened
01

The United States and China extended their bilateral trade truce, known as the Busan Agreement, to January 10, 2027, avoiding fresh tariffs and trade restrictions between the two economies during the extension period.

02

A trade think tank, the Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI), assessed that the extension leaves India comparatively more exposed than China to a new US law permitting tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian energy.

03

The law, enacted by the US Congress in September 2026, authorizes the US administration to impose such tariffs on countries ranking among the largest purchasers of Russian oil and natural gas; GTRI's founder noted that China has secured a national-security-linked exemption from these provisions while India has not.

04

Indian exports already face a cumulative US tariff of 50% (a 25% reciprocal tariff plus a 25% additional tariff tied to India's purchases of Russian crude), and the new law is seen as adding to Washington's negotiating leverage in ongoing India-US trade talks.

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The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, 2026 — Statutory Secondary Tariff Authority

This is the "new law" referenced in the news: a congressional statute (not a presidential executive order) that grants the US administration discretionary authority, for five years, to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from countries ranking among the largest importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas. Because it is an act of Congress rather than an emergency-powers order, it cannot be undone by a simple future executive decision, unlike tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

Key Details

  • Passed the Senate 86–11 (August 7, 2026) and the House 262–159 (September 16, 2026); signed into law on September 18, 2026 (also referenced as H.R. 5334)
  • Covers the countries ranking among the five largest importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas by volume in the 12 months preceding enactment, if they make new qualifying purchases on or after October 18, 2026 (30 days after signing)
  • Grants the administration tariff authority of up to 100% for a five-year period
  • The "covered country" list is to be reviewed and updated every 180 days
  • Named for Senator Lindsey Graham, who negotiated the bill's terms before his death in July 2026
Connection to this news

This is exactly the "new powers" GTRI's founder referenced. The article's central claim is that the Busan truce effectively shields China from this law through a national-security-linked carve-out, while India — which has not secured a comparable exemption — remains squarely within its scope.

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Secondary Sanctions/Tariffs and the WTO's Most-Favoured-Nation Principle

Sanctions and tariff measures are broadly classified as "primary" (binding only US persons and entities, typically under IEEPA) or "secondary" (extraterritorial measures that penalize third-country actors for dealing with a sanctioned country, regardless of any US nexus). The Graham Act's tariff mechanism functions like a secondary sanction but is implemented through ordinary tariff authority rather than a national-emergency declaration. At the multilateral level, GATT Article I codifies the WTO's Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle, requiring members to extend identical tariff treatment to "like products" from all trading partners; country-specific punitive tariffs depart from this norm unless justified by an exception such as GATT Article XXI's national-security exception.

Key Details

  • GATT Article I: the MFN non-discrimination principle, foundational to the WTO/GATT system since 1947
  • GATT Article XXI: the security exception WTO members invoke to justify departures from MFN obligations; a 2019 WTO panel ruling (Russia – Traffic in Transit) held that invocation of Article XXI is subject to some degree of review, not entirely self-judging
  • CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 2017) is the key precedent for Congress mandating secondary sanctions on Russia, Iran, and North Korea, reducing presidential discretion compared to IEEPA-based measures
  • IEEPA remains the usual statutory basis for primary, emergency-declaration tariffs (used in earlier rounds of US tariff actions), distinct from the Graham Act's ordinary legislative tariff authority
Connection to this news

The China exemption cited by GTRI is framed around national-security-type reasoning, echoing the logic states use under GATT Article XXI to escape MFN obligations, while India — lacking an equivalent geopolitical bargaining chip in the current dispensation — remains fully exposed to the secondary-tariff mechanism.

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India's Russian Crude Oil Dependence and Energy Security Policy

Russia became India's largest crude oil supplier after 2022, when discounted pricing followed Western sanctions on Russian energy exports; before the war, Russia supplied under 2% of India's crude imports. Since then, Russia's share of India's import basket has fluctuated sharply with global sanctions enforcement and price dynamics, giving India a structural dependence that makes it a natural target under volume-based tariff triggers like the Graham Act.

Key Details

  • Russia's share of India's crude oil imports rose from under 2% before 2022 to a record high of about 50.83% in July 2026, having earlier troughed at 21.2% in January 2026 — the lowest since October 2022
  • In 2024, China imported about $62.6 billion worth of Russian oil compared to India's $52.7 billion, a comparison GTRI has used to argue India is being singled out disproportionately
  • India's official position, reiterated by the Ministry of External Affairs, is that energy sourcing decisions are market-driven and aimed at ensuring energy security for its population
Connection to this news

The scale and volatility of this dependence is precisely why India ranks among the "covered countries" under the Graham Act's volume-based test, and why GTRI frames continued Russian crude purchases as a direct trigger for the law's 100% tariff provision.

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India-US Bilateral Trade Negotiations

India and the US have been negotiating a bilateral trade agreement, with Indian officials describing the deal as nearing completion contingent on securing a preferential tariff rate relative to competing exporters such as Vietnam and Bangladesh. Indian exports currently face a cumulative US tariff of 50%, comprising a 25% reciprocal tariff and a 25% additional tariff linked to India's Russian crude purchases, imposed in 2025.

Key Details

  • Current cumulative US tariff on Indian exports: 50% (25% reciprocal + 25% tied to Russian crude purchases)
  • India's negotiating objective is a preferential rate compared to competing supplier nations, not merely a reduction in absolute terms
  • Trade talks are expected to continue at the G20 Trade Ministerial meeting in Milwaukee, scheduled for September 30–October 1, 2026
  • India's Ministry of External Affairs stated (September 17, 2026) that the Graham Act could have implications "not just for the bilateral relationship but also the international energy market"
Connection to this news

GTRI's core argument is that the 100% tariff authority functions as additional negotiating leverage for Washington in these talks, potentially used to extract trade concessions from India by offering a lower effective rate in exchange.

Key facts & data
  • Busan Agreement (US-China trade truce) extended to: January 10, 2027
  • Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act: Senate passage 86–11 (August 7, 2026); House passage 262–159 (September 16, 2026); signed September 18, 2026
  • Tariff authority under the Act: up to 100%, for 5 years, on top-5 importers of Russian crude oil/natural gas making new purchases on or after October 18, 2026
  • "Covered country" list under the Act reviewed every 180 days
  • Current cumulative US tariff on Indian exports: 50% (25% reciprocal + 25% Russia-linked)
  • China's 2024 Russian oil imports: approximately $62.6 billion, versus India's approximately $52.7 billion
  • Russia's share of India's crude oil imports: under 2% before 2022; record high of about 50.83% in July 2026; low of 21.2% in January 2026
  • G20 Trade Ministerial meeting: Milwaukee, September 30–October 1, 2026
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