Jaishankar 'reiterates India’s interests & concerns’ over Russia sanctions act in talks with Rubio
India's Ministry of External Affairs held bilateral talks with the United States' Department of State on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, reiterating India's interests and concerns regarding a new US sanctions law targeting Russia and Iran.
The discussions followed the signing into law, on September 18, 2026, of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which expands US statutory authority to impose sanctions and tariffs linked to Russian energy trade.
The law authorizes tariffs of up to 100% on the top five importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas, with exemptions for countries importing less than 15% of their natural gas from Russia and taking steps to reduce such imports.
India is currently among the largest global importers of Russian crude oil, making the implementation of this law a direct trade and energy-security concern for New Delhi.
The talks also touched on the broader Russia-Ukraine conflict situation.
The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, 2026
This is a new US federal law, signed on September 18, 2026, that grants the US President expanded statutory power to impose sanctions, tariffs, and other trade restrictions connected to Russian and Iranian energy exports. It extends secondary sanctions exposure to foreign entities — including those outside the US — that engage in transactions supporting Russia's military, energy, or financial sectors.
Key Details
- Signed into law: September 18, 2026 (as H.R. 5334)
- Authorizes tariffs of up to 100% on the top five importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas
- Carries a carve-out for countries importing under 15% of their gas from Russia while reducing such imports
- Separately extends the sunset date of the Iran Sanctions Act, 1996 (covering Iran's energy sector and weapons proliferation activity) to 2031
- Targets Russian government officials, financial institutions, and the energy sector, and broadens secondary sanctions to third-country entities
As one of the two largest global buyers of Russian crude (alongside China), India is directly exposed to the law's tariff mechanism, prompting the Ministry of External Affairs to raise India's trade and energy interests with US counterparts.
CAATSA and the Precedent of Secondary Sanctions on India
The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), enacted by the US Congress in 2017, is the earlier framework under which the US has previously threatened secondary sanctions against India — providing a template for how India has navigated similar sanctions pressure before.
Key Details
- CAATSA Section 231 mandates secondary sanctions on countries conducting "significant transactions" in defence hardware with Russia's defence/intelligence sectors
- India's 2018 agreement (worth over $5 billion) to purchase the Russian S-400 Triumf air defence system qualified as such a transaction
- Successive US administrations have declined to formally sanction India under Section 231, using presidential waiver discretion tied to national-interest certification
- By contrast, the US did impose CAATSA Section 231 sanctions on Turkey (December 2020) over its S-400 purchase
The 2026 Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act operates on a similar secondary-sanctions logic but targets energy trade rather than defence procurement, and unlike CAATSA's case-by-case waiver, it applies a blanket tariff formula to the top five Russian oil/gas importers — reducing the scope for a discretionary country-specific exemption.
India's Energy Diversification and Strategic Autonomy
India's external engagement on sanctions issues reflects its long-standing foreign policy approach of "strategic autonomy" — maintaining independent trade and energy relationships rather than aligning fully with any single bloc's sanctions regime, while diversifying import sources for energy security.
Key Details
- Russia has in recent years been among India's top crude oil suppliers by volume, though its share of India's import basket has fluctuated with changing sanctions and price dynamics
- Following US sanctions on major Russian oil companies in November 2025, Indian refiners began actively diversifying toward Gulf suppliers (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait)
- India has stated it will take necessary measures to protect its trade and economic interests while continuing to diversify energy sourcing
- This approach traces to India's non-aligned foreign policy tradition, distinct from formal treaty alliance commitments
The Ministry of External Affairs' engagement with the US State Department reflects an attempt to balance the strategic partnership with Washington against the economic imperative of continued, diversified energy imports, including from Russia.
- Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act signed into law: September 18, 2026
- Maximum tariff authorized on top-5 Russian oil/gas importers: 100%
- Exemption threshold: countries importing less than 15% of natural gas from Russia, while reducing imports
- Iran Sanctions Act, 1996 sunset extended to: 2031
- CAATSA enacted: 2017 (targets Russia, Iran, North Korea); Section 231 covers "significant transactions" in Russian defence hardware
- India's 2018 S-400 deal value: over $5 billion (specifically reported as $5.43 billion) [Unverified — figure drawn from secondary sources, not the government's official contract disclosure]
- Countries most affected by the new tariff authority: China and India, the two largest global buyers of Russian crude oil