In meeting with Rubio, Jaishankar raises India’s concerns about sanctions Act
The External Affairs Minister met the US Secretary of State on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly's high-level week and raised India's concerns about a newly enacted US sanctions law targeting Russia and Iran
The two sides are also understood to be preparing the ground for high-level engagement between the US President and the Indian Prime Minister later in the year
The discussion touched on the Gulf and Ukraine situations more broadly, alongside the bilateral trade and energy relationship
India reiterated that it would take necessary measures to protect its trade and economic interests while continuing to diversify its energy sourcing
The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026
This law, signed by the US President on 18 September 2026, expands US secondary-sanctions authority against countries and entities dealing with Russia's energy, financial, and military sectors, and extends sanctions on Iran's energy and weapons sectors. It grants the US President discretionary authority to impose steep tariffs on the largest purchasers of Russian oil and gas.
Key Details
- The Act authorises tariffs of up to 100% on the five largest purchasers of Russian oil and natural gas, and separately allows duties of up to 500% on the value of goods of Russian origin imported into the United States
- China and India, as the two largest purchasers of discounted Russian crude following the post-2022 shift in global oil-trade patterns, are the countries most exposed to the law's tariff provisions
- The Act also extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 for a further five years, through 2031
- Unlike a UN Security Council sanctions resolution (binding on all member states), this is unilateral US domestic legislation, enforceable through secondary sanctions on non-US entities that transact with the designated sectors
India's energy-import relationship with Russia, built up since 2022, places it among the countries most exposed to the new law's tariff-linked provisions, explaining why the sanctions law featured prominently in the ministerial-level discussion.
CAATSA (2017) and the S-400 Precedent for Sanctions Exemptions
The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), enacted in August 2017, mandates secondary sanctions under Section 231 on entities that engage in "significant transactions" with Russia's defence or intelligence sectors. India's 2018 purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system tested this provision directly.
Key Details
- India signed a $5.43 billion agreement for the S-400 Triumf system with Russia in October 2018, a transaction that met the threshold for a potential Section 231 "significant transaction" determination
- Despite this, successive US administrations declined to make a formal Section 231 determination against India, exercising discretionary non-determination, even though Turkey was sanctioned in 2020 for an equivalent S-400 purchase
- A 2018 amendment to CAATSA created a formal waiver authority (Section 235) allowing the US President to waive sanctions where a country is reducing its dependence on Russian defence equipment or where a waiver serves US national-security interests
- This precedent illustrates that US sanctions statutes generally carry presidential waiver or discretionary-enforcement mechanisms, which India has previously sought to invoke, and is now seeking to invoke again regarding the 2026 Act
India's diplomatic outreach to secure clarity or a carve-out under the new sanctions law mirrors its earlier, ultimately successful, effort to avoid a Section 231 sanctions determination over the S-400 purchase under CAATSA.
India's Strategic Autonomy and Energy Diversification Policy
India's foreign-policy doctrine of "strategic autonomy" (an evolution of Cold War-era non-alignment) allows it to maintain simultaneous, independent partnerships with the US, Russia, and Gulf energy suppliers, rather than aligning fully with any single power's sanctions regime. This has translated into a deliberate policy of diversifying crude-oil sourcing rather than depending on any one supplier bloc.
Key Details
- India has stated that its energy purchases are guided by market factors, price, and national energy-security needs, and has consistently defended its right to make sovereign sourcing decisions
- Discounted Russian crude became a major component of India's oil-import basket after 2022, reducing import costs but simultaneously increasing exposure to secondary sanctions regimes such as the 2026 Act
- India's response to sanctions pressure has typically combined diplomatic engagement (seeking waivers or exemptions) with continued diversification across Gulf, US, and African crude suppliers to reduce single-source dependence
- The bilateral engagement also serves as groundwork for a planned high-level meeting between the two governments' leaders, indicating that the sanctions issue is being managed as part of the broader trade and strategic relationship rather than in isolation
Raising the sanctions law directly with the US Secretary of State reflects India's established approach of managing potentially adverse US legislation through direct diplomatic channels while preserving its independent energy-sourcing strategy.
- Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026: signed into law 18 September 2026; authorises tariffs of up to 100% on the top five buyers of Russian oil/gas and duties of up to 500% on Russian-origin goods
- CAATSA: enacted August 2017 (Public Law 115-44); Section 231 covers "significant transactions" with Russia's defence/intelligence sectors; Section 235 (added 2018) provides presidential waiver authority
- India-Russia S-400 deal: signed October 2018, valued at approximately $5.43 billion; no Section 231 determination was ever made against India, unlike Turkey (sanctioned in 2020 for the same system)
- Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: extended by the 2026 Act for five more years, through 2031
- India and China are identified as the two largest global purchasers of Russian crude oil in the post-2022 period