U.S. House passes Russia sanctions bill seeking to impose up to 100% tariffs on India, others
The US House of Representatives advanced the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, after the Senate had already passed it by a wide margin, sending it toward a final vote and the President's desk.
The bill grants the US President discretionary authority to impose secondary tariffs of up to 100% on goods from countries that continue to import Russian oil, gas, uranium, and petroleum products.
A House amendment explicitly named ten countries — including India, China, Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, the UAE, Singapore, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic — as eligible for such tariffs if the law is enacted and the President chooses to act; the amendment itself does not impose the tariff.
If signed and invoked, the new tariff authority would sit on top of the 50% cumulative tariff the US has already imposed on Indian goods since August 2025 over India's Russian oil purchases.
India has maintained that its energy trade with Russia does not breach any United Nations Security Council sanctions and reflects energy-security and strategic-autonomy considerations.
Secondary Sanctions and CAATSA
Secondary sanctions penalize third parties (a country, bank, or company) for doing business with a sanctioned entity, as opposed to primary sanctions that restrict trade directly with the sanctioned country. The US Congress enacted the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in 2017, in response to Russian interference in the 2016 US elections, to allow secondary sanctions on entities engaging in "significant transactions" with Russia's defence and intelligence sectors.
Key Details
- CAATSA Section 231 covers transactions with Russia's defence/intelligence sector.
- India's 2018 contract to buy five regiments of the Russian S-400 air defence system (~$5.4 billion) exposed it to potential CAATSA action; both the first Trump administration and the Biden administration avoided a formal "significant transaction" determination against India, effectively a silent non-determination rather than a public waiver.
- CAATSA's legal hook is defence/intelligence transactions, distinct from the new bill's broader hook of energy trade with Russia.
The new sanctions bill continues the pattern CAATSA set in 2017 — using secondary, extraterritorial measures to pressure countries maintaining strategic ties with Russia — but shifts the trigger from defence purchases to energy imports, and the tool from sanctions/asset freezes to tariffs.
IEEPA and US Executive Tariff Authority
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 1977 allows the US President to regulate international commerce after declaring a national emergency in response to an "unusual and extraordinary threat." It has increasingly been used as a basis for imposing tariffs, distinct from the more procedurally involved Section 301 (unfair trade practices) or Section 232 (national security) tariff authorities under US trade law.
Key Details
- On 6 August 2025, the US President issued an executive order under IEEPA imposing an additional 25% tariff on most Indian goods, effective 27 August 2025, citing India's continued import of Russian-origin oil.
- Combined with an existing 25% reciprocal tariff, this brought the cumulative IEEPA-based tariff on covered Indian goods to 50%.
- The new legislative sanctions bill, if enacted, would give the President a statutory (congressionally authorized) basis for tariffs on Russia-linked trade, which is more durable than an emergency executive order that can be challenged in court or reversed by a successor administration.
The bill would supplement — not replace — the existing IEEPA-based tariff regime on India, giving Washington a second, Congress-backed legal channel to raise tariffs specifically tied to Russian energy purchases.
India–Russia Energy Trade and Strategic Autonomy
India imports close to 85–88% of its crude oil requirement. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, discounted Russian crude has become a major component of India's import basket, a shift India frames as a sovereign economic decision under its policy of strategic autonomy rather than alignment with either side of the conflict.
Key Details
- Russia's share of India's crude oil import bill has fluctuated sharply — falling below 25% in early 2026 before rebounding to around 38% by April 2026 — and Russia has remained India's top single crude supplier for much of FY 2025–26, ahead of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
- No United Nations Security Council resolution currently bars the purchase of Russian oil; existing restrictions (the G7/EU price cap, EU and US sanctions) are unilateral or plurilateral measures outside the UN framework.
- India has consistently invoked its long-standing non-alignment-derived doctrine of strategic autonomy to justify continued Russian energy purchases while also expanding energy ties with the US and Gulf suppliers.
Because Russia supplies a large and often the largest share of India's crude imports, India is directly named as a target country in the bill's secondary-tariff framework, making this legislation a live test of how far the US is willing to press its energy-sanctions regime against a strategic partner.
- CAATSA was enacted by the US Congress in 2017.
- India's S-400 deal (2018) was worth approximately $5.4 billion for five regiments.
- The 6 August 2025 IEEPA executive order raised the cumulative US tariff on Indian goods to 50%, effective 27 August 2025.
- Russia's share of India's crude oil import bill reached roughly 38% in April 2026, after dipping below 25% earlier in the year.
- The new sanctions bill's amendment lists ten countries — including India and China — as eligible for secondary tariffs of up to 100% under presidential discretion.