BRICS leaders voice concern over ‘growing risks’ of nuclear conflict
The New Delhi Declaration, adopted at the 18th BRICS Summit on 12 September 2026, states: "We express concern about the growing risks of nuclear danger and conflict," and calls for "invigorating the system of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation" to preserve global stability.
Leaders separately voiced concern over "deliberate attacks" on civilian infrastructure and on "peaceful nuclear facilities" under full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, asserting that nuclear safety must be upheld "including in armed conflicts."
The declaration reaffirmed support for existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and their negative security assurances, and called for accelerating long-pending efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, urging all invited parties to engage "in good faith" with that process.
This language does not name any specific country or conflict, consistent with BRICS' consensus-based, non-attributive drafting style, but arrives against the backdrop of the February 2026 US-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear-related sites and the continuing Russia-Ukraine war.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and India's Non-Signatory Status
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature in 1968 and in force from 1970, is the cornerstone global arms-control instrument, dividing states into five recognised "Nuclear Weapon States" (those that tested before 1 January 1967: US, USSR/Russia, UK, France, China) and all other states as "Non-Nuclear Weapon States" that must forgo weapons and accept IAEA safeguards. India has never signed the NPT, calling it discriminatory for permanently legitimising the five original nuclear powers' arsenals while restricting all others, without a credible, time-bound disarmament obligation on the weapon states.
Key Details
- The NPT has near-universal membership (191 states) but excludes India, Pakistan, Israel (non-signatories) and North Korea (withdrew in 2003).
- India instead has a bilateral "123 Agreement" (civil nuclear cooperation agreement) with the US (2008) and IAEA-negotiated facility-specific safeguards for its civilian reactors, without joining the NPT as a whole.
- India conducted nuclear tests in 1974 (Pokhran-I) and 1998 (Pokhran-II) and declared itself a nuclear-weapon state, a status not recognised under the NPT framework since India tested after the 1967 cut-off.
The declaration's call to "invigorate" the disarmament and non-proliferation "system" implicitly references the NPT-centred global order, even though several BRICS members — India and Pakistan among non-signatories, and the five NPT-recognised weapon states including Russia and China as BRICS members — sit on different sides of that very framework, complicating any specific NPT-reform language.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and India's Position
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996, bans all nuclear explosions for both civilian and military purposes. It has not entered into force because it requires ratification by all 44 "Annex 2" states with nuclear technology capability, and several of these — including India, Pakistan, North Korea (non-signatories) and the US, China, Israel, Iran, Egypt (signed but not ratified) — have not completed ratification.
Key Details
- India voted against the CTBT's adoption at the UN in 1996, citing the absence of a time-bound framework for complete nuclear disarmament by existing weapon states and concerns the treaty would freeze India's strategic options.
- India has, however, observed a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing since its 1998 Pokhran-II tests.
- India's declared nuclear doctrine (2003) is built on "No First Use" and "credible minimum deterrence," meaning nuclear weapons are retained only to deter and retaliate, not for first-strike use — a distinct national position from the multilateral disarmament architecture referenced in the BRICS text.
The declaration's generic call for strengthening "arms control and non-proliferation" sits alongside the reality that BRICS itself includes both treaty-recognised nuclear states (Russia, China) and non-signatory nuclear-armed states (India), making any concrete follow-through on disarmament language structurally difficult within the grouping.
IAEA Safeguards and Nuclear Facility Protection in Armed Conflict
IAEA safeguards are technical and legal measures — verification inspections, materials accounting, and monitoring — through which the International Atomic Energy Agency (established 1957) confirms that a state's nuclear material is not diverted to weapons use. Facilities under "full-scope" or comprehensive safeguards are typically civilian and monitored end-to-end, distinguishing them from undeclared or military nuclear sites.
Key Details
- Physical attacks on IAEA-safeguarded facilities raise concerns under international humanitarian law and nuclear-safety norms (echoing IAEA Director General statements on the "seven pillars" of nuclear safety during armed conflict, first articulated during the 2022 Zaporizhzhia plant crisis in Ukraine).
- The February 2026 US-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear-related sites are the direct real-world referent for the declaration's language on attacks on "peaceful nuclear facilities" under IAEA safeguards.
- A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) is a treaty-based regional arrangement (existing examples: Latin America's Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967; Southeast Asia's Bangkok Treaty, 1995; Africa's Pelindaba Treaty, 1996) under which member states commit not to develop, test, or host nuclear weapons; a Middle East NWFZ has been proposed at the UN since the 1970s but never realised due to the unresolved status of Israel's undeclared arsenal.
By coupling concern over "growing risks of nuclear conflict" with explicit language on protecting IAEA-safeguarded facilities and reviving the stalled Middle East NWFZ proposal, the declaration links the West Asia crisis directly to established non-proliferation and nuclear-safety frameworks that are standard, testable GS2/GS3 concepts.
- New Delhi Declaration adopted: 12 September 2026, 18th BRICS Summit.
- NPT: opened 1968, in force 1970, recognises 5 Nuclear Weapon States (US, Russia, UK, France, China); India, Pakistan, Israel are non-signatories.
- CTBT: adopted 1996; not in force; requires ratification by all 44 Annex 2 states, including India, which has not signed it.
- India's nuclear doctrine (2003): No First Use + credible minimum deterrence; nuclear tests conducted in 1974 and 1998.
- Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: proposed at the UN since the 1970s, still unimplemented as of the 2026 declaration.