China’s grey-zone game: Why India must prepare for ‘armed coexistence’
An analysis piece characterises China's approach along its disputed border with India as "grey-zone warfare" — actions calibrated to stay below the threshold that would trigger open armed conflict
It argues the India-China border relationship has shifted from "peaceful coexistence" to what it terms "armed coexistence" since the 2020 Eastern Ladakh standoff
Cited grey-zone tactics include military posturing near the border, use of paramilitary and militia-type forces, incremental infrastructure construction, and gradual territorial assertion ("salami-slicing")
The piece calls for India to develop doctrine and capability suited to a prolonged state of managed tension rather than expecting a return to pre-2020 stability
What Is Grey-Zone Warfare
Grey-zone warfare refers to coercive activity — military, paramilitary, economic, cyber, or informational — conducted below the threshold that would justify a conventional military response, allowing an actor to alter facts on the ground while avoiding the risks of open war.
Key Details
- The concept is distinguished from "hybrid warfare" (which typically blends conventional and unconventional means during active conflict) by its explicit focus on peacetime/pre-war coercion
- China has used grey-zone tactics in the South China Sea via maritime militia harassing other claimants' fishing and naval vessels, and along the LAC via infrastructure build-up, border villages ("xiaokang" model villages), and use of herders/militia to contest grazing areas
- The tactic exploits ambiguity — actions are deniable or framed as routine, making a proportionate response difficult to calibrate
The article's core argument is that China's LAC posture since 2020 fits this grey-zone pattern rather than either genuine peace or open war.
LAC vs LoC vs International Border — Definitional Distinctions
UPSC frequently tests the difference between India's three border-management lines, each with a different legal and historical basis.
Key Details
- The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the de facto line separating Indian and Chinese-controlled territory; it is not mutually delineated or demarcated on the ground, and the two sides differ on its length — India assesses it at about 3,488 km, China at roughly 2,000 km
- The Line of Control (LoC) separates Indian- and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, formalised by the Simla Agreement of 1972
- The International Border (IB) refers to boundaries mutually recognised and settled under international law (e.g., the Radcliffe Line-based India-Pakistan border in Punjab/Gujarat sectors)
The absence of a mutually agreed, demarcated LAC — unlike the more clearly defined LoC — is precisely what creates space for the grey-zone ambiguity the article describes.
Border Confidence-Building Mechanisms (1993, 1996, 2005, 2013)
A series of bilateral agreements built the CBM architecture that maintained relative border calm for over four decades before 2020, and which the article implies has been eroded.
Key Details
- 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC — the first formal bilateral agreement recognising and requiring both sides to respect the LAC
- 1996 CBM Agreement — prohibited opening fire, use of hazardous materials, or blast operations within 2 km of the LAC
- 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles — set principles for a border settlement, including protection of settled populations
- 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) — added hotlines and flag-meeting protocols to prevent face-offs from escalating
The Galwan clash of June 2020 — the first fatalities on the LAC since 1975 — is widely seen as marking the practical breakdown of these CBMs, giving rise to the "armed coexistence" framing used in the article.
Special Representatives (SR) Mechanism and the 2024 Disengagement
The SR mechanism is India-China's highest-level channel for the boundary question, and its recent revival is relevant context for assessing whether grey-zone tensions are being managed institutionally.
Key Details
- Established in 2003 as the top-level, NSA/Foreign Minister-equivalent channel for resolving the boundary dispute — its 23rd round was held in Beijing in December 2024
- On October 21, 2024, India and China reached a patrolling arrangement leading to disengagement at Depsang Bulge and near Demchok — the last two of six friction points from the 2020 standoff not yet resolved (the other four had been settled earlier)
- Disengagement was followed by resumption of patrolling and revival of dialogue mechanisms, including the SR talks
The article's argument is that even with the SR mechanism revived and 2020-era disengagement completed, the underlying relationship has permanently shifted to a state of managed, armed tension rather than reverting to the pre-2020 status quo.
- LAC length: ~3,488 km per India's assessment; ~2,000 km per China's assessment
- Galwan Valley clash: June 2020 — first LAC fatalities since 1975
- Key CBM agreements: 1993 (Peace and Tranquility), 1996 (CBMs), 2005 (Political Parameters), 2013 (BDCA)
- SR mechanism established: 2003; 23rd round held December 2024, Beijing
- 2024 disengagement (Depsang and Demchok): agreed October 21, 2024 — last two of six 2020-era friction points