EAM Jaishankar to visit Russia amid Trump’s tariff threat
The External Affairs Minister is set to visit Russia to co-chair the 27th Session of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC), alongside meetings with Russia's Foreign Minister
The visit comes as the US has threatened a secondary tariff of up to 100% on countries that continue to purchase Russian oil, gas or uranium
It also follows an earlier US decision to raise tariffs on Indian goods to 50%, which included an additional component linked to India's purchases of Russian crude oil
The visit is being read as India signalling continuity in its energy and economic engagement with Russia despite external tariff pressure
IRIGC-TEC — India's Institutional Mechanism for Russia Relations
The India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) is the principal institutional platform through which the two countries coordinate economic cooperation outside the annual Summit-level track.
Key Details
- IRIGC-TEC is co-chaired from the Indian side by the External Affairs Minister and from the Russian side by a Deputy Prime Minister-level counterpart, distinguishing it from the India-Russia Annual Summit (Head of State/Government level) and the "2+2" Defence and Foreign Ministers' Dialogue
- The mechanism covers trade and investment, energy, connectivity, science and technology, and cultural cooperation, and meets roughly annually, alternating venues between India and Russia
- It functions alongside, but separately from, the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership framework that has governed India-Russia ties since 2010
- The 2026 session is the 27th in the series, reflecting a mechanism that has run for over two decades
The visit uses this standing bilateral institution — rather than an ad hoc meeting — to formalise continued India-Russia economic engagement precisely when a third country's tariff threat is targeting that engagement.
India's Energy Security and Russian Crude Diversification
India's import of discounted Russian crude oil, which began scaling up sharply after 2022, is the specific trade flow that the threatened US secondary tariff targets.
Key Details
- Russia has at times become India's single largest source of crude oil in 2026, with its share of India's crude import basket reported as high as 38-48% in different months of the year, compared to a low single-digit share before 2022
- The price discount India secured on Russian crude has narrowed considerably through 2026 (from a wider discount in earlier years to a much smaller premium/discount band by mid-2026), reducing but not eliminating the economic incentive
- India's crude sourcing otherwise remains diversified across Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, reflecting the broader Gulf-dependence discussed in India's energy security framework
- A separate US tariff track has already raised duties on Indian goods to 50%, with a stated additional component tied specifically to India's continued purchase of Russian oil
The IRIGC-TEC visit signals that India intends to continue its energy relationship with Russia despite this pressure, framing the trip as an assertion of India's stated doctrine of "strategic autonomy" in trade and energy sourcing decisions.
Secondary Sanctions and Tariffs — The CAATSA Precedent
The threat of a US secondary tariff on countries buying Russian energy echoes an earlier US legal mechanism — CAATSA — used against countries transacting with Russia's defence and energy sectors, which is directly relevant to how India previously navigated similar US pressure.
Key Details
- The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), 2017, authorises the US President to impose secondary sanctions on any entity engaged in a "significant transaction" with Russia's defence or intelligence sectors
- India faced potential CAATSA exposure over its 2018 agreement to purchase the Russian S-400 Triumf air defence system; the US has historically not imposed CAATSA sanctions on India for this purchase, exercising discretionary restraint rather than a formal statutory waiver
- Unlike CAATSA (a sanctions statute targeting the transacting entity), the 2026 secondary tariff threat is a trade-tariff mechanism aimed at the importing country's exports to the US — a different legal tool with the same coercive logic of penalising third-country dealings with Russia
- India's response in both cases has invoked its doctrine of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, engaging with the US, Russia and Quad partners simultaneously without treating any one relationship as exclusive
The current Russia visit, conducted despite an active US tariff threat, mirrors India's earlier CAATSA-era approach — continuing defence/energy engagement with Russia while managing the broader relationship with the US.
- IRIGC-TEC 2026 session: 27th in the series; India side co-chaired by the External Affairs Minister
- Russia's share of India's crude oil imports in 2026: reported between roughly 38% and 48.6% in different months
- US secondary tariff threatened on Russian oil/gas/uranium buyers: up to 100%
- Existing US tariff rate on Indian goods (as of 2026): 50%, including a component linked to Russian crude purchases
- CAATSA enacted: 2 August 2017; targets "significant transactions" with Russia's defence/intelligence sectors
- India-Russia Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership: in place since 2010