US Criticizes China Over Nuclear Missile Test in Pacific Ocean
The United States raised concerns over China's conduct of a submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test into the Pacific Ocean, citing inadequate advance notice.
US officials stated that China's notification, where given, arrived only a few hours before the launch and lacked the level of detail expected under established international practice.
A joint statement on ballistic missile launch notifications was issued at a multilateral disarmament forum in Geneva, with dozens of countries calling for at least 24-hour advance notice ahead of long-range ballistic missile launches.
China rejected the criticism, stating that it had provided advance notification to the United States and other countries and had taken measures to avoid harming any country's interests.
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC)
The HCoC is a voluntary, non-legally-binding multilateral transparency and confidence-building mechanism under which subscribing states commit to pre-launch notifications for ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle tests, to reduce the risk of misperception or accidental escalation.
Key Details
- Adopted in The Hague in 2002; it does not ban missile tests but requires advance notification and annual declarations of missile and space-launch policies from subscribing states.
- Currently has around 145 subscribing states; China is not a subscribing state and is therefore not bound by its commitments — a key distinction repeatedly cited in the notification dispute.
- India subscribed to the HCoC in 2016, alongside joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) the same year, reflecting India's alignment with global missile-transparency norms.
- The HCoC is administered from Vienna and operates outside the UN framework, distinguishing it from binding treaty-based arms control instruments.
The core of the US complaint is that China's notification practice fell short of the pre-launch notice and detail standards that HCoC-subscribing states — including all other recognised nuclear-weapon states except China — have adopted, even though China is not legally bound to follow them.
India-Pakistan Pre-Notification Agreement on Ballistic Missile Flight Testing (2005)
This bilateral agreement is a regional example of the kind of nuclear-risk-reduction and confidence-building measure (CBM) at the centre of the broader transparency debate illustrated by the China test controversy.
Key Details
- Signed on 3 October 2005, it requires each side to give the other no less than three days' advance notice of a five-day launch window for any land- or sea-launched, surface-to-surface ballistic missile test.
- Test sites and impact areas must be kept at least 40 km and 75 km, respectively, from the International Boundary/Line of Control, and trajectories may not cross it.
- It is one of several India-Pakistan nuclear CBMs, alongside the 1988 Non-Attack on Nuclear Installations Agreement and the 2007 hotline/pre-notification arrangements on nuclear accidents.
It illustrates how bilateral pre-notification frameworks — distinct from multilateral instruments like the HCoC — can institutionalise the same transparency norm the US is now seeking, on an ad hoc basis, from China.
China's Nuclear Arsenal Expansion and the P5 Transparency Debate
The dispute over notification practice is set against the backdrop of a rapidly expanding Chinese nuclear arsenal, which has intensified US calls for China to adopt the transparency and arms-control practices followed by other nuclear-weapon states recognised under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Key Details
- The US Department of Defense's China Military Power Report estimated China's operational nuclear warhead stockpile had surpassed 600 as of recent assessments, projecting growth beyond 1,000 warheads by 2030.
- China is one of the five NPT-recognised Nuclear Weapon States (P5: US, Russia, UK, France, China), but unlike the US and Russia, it is not party to bilateral strategic arms-limitation treaties such as New START (a US-Russia bilateral treaty, not applicable to China).
- China maintains a stated No-First-Use (NFU) nuclear doctrine, a position India also formally adopted after its 1998 nuclear tests.
- ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) tests are distinguished from shorter-range tests by their strategic significance — ICBMs have ranges exceeding 5,500 km, capable of intercontinental delivery.
The notification dispute is one manifestation of a wider strategic concern — as China's arsenal grows toward parity-scale numbers, the absence of Chinese participation in established transparency and arms-control mechanisms (HCoC, New START-style treaties) is increasingly highlighted by other nuclear powers.
- China's ICBM/SLBM test: conducted in the Pacific Ocean, reported around early July 2026.
- US-stated notification gap: notice given only a few hours in advance, versus the 24-hour minimum sought in the Geneva joint statement.
- HCoC: adopted 2002, ~145 subscribing states; China is not a subscriber; India subscribed in 2016.
- China's estimated nuclear warhead stockpile: surpassed 600 as of recent US Department of Defense assessment, with projected growth beyond 1,000 by 2030.
- India-Pakistan Ballistic Missile Pre-Notification Agreement: signed 3 October 2005; minimum 3 days' notice for a 5-day launch window.
- ICBM range threshold: greater than 5,500 km (per standard missile-range classification).