Will Houthi attacks on Saudi ships hurt India | Explained
Yemen's Houthi movement declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia, announcing it would target Saudi-, Israeli-, and US-linked tankers transiting the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
Two Saudi oil tankers were subsequently attacked, with one confirmed to have caught fire; one of the vessels was reportedly carrying Saudi crude bound for India, while the other was headed to China.
The disruption compounds existing strain on global oil chokepoints, given that the Strait of Hormuz has also been effectively constrained amid regional tensions, raising the prospect of simultaneous pressure on two of the world's most critical maritime oil arteries.
Shipping and energy analysts are monitoring tanker movements and freight/insurance costs for signs of a broader rerouting of Red Sea-bound traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, as occurred during the 2023-24 Red Sea shipping crisis.
Maritime Chokepoints: Bab el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz
A maritime chokepoint is a narrow strait or passage that channels a disproportionate share of global shipping and energy trade, making it strategically vital and vulnerable to disruption. Bab el-Mandeb ("Gate of Tears") separates Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea, connecting the Red Sea (and hence the Suez Canal) to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean; the Strait of Hormuz separates Iran from Oman/UAE, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea.
Key Details
- Roughly 6-7 million barrels per day of crude oil typically transit Bab el-Mandeb, versus around 20.9 million barrels per day (about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption) through the Strait of Hormuz.
- About 83% of crude oil and condensate passing through Hormuz historically moves to Asian markets — chiefly China, India, Japan, and South Korea.
- Around half the crude transiting Bab el-Mandeb is Saudi crude loaded at Yanbu on the Red Sea coast; a significant share of the remainder is Russian crude bound for India.
With Hormuz already constrained by regional tensions, a Bab el-Mandeb disruption threatens a second, simultaneous chokepoint squeeze — directly relevant to India, since Russian crude cargoes routed through this strait form part of India's diversified oil-import basket.
India's Crude Oil Import Dependence and Energy Security
India imports roughly 85-88% of its crude oil requirement, making chokepoint disruptions in the Persian Gulf/Red Sea corridor a direct energy-security concern. India's crude sourcing has diversified substantially since 2022 to include discounted Russian crude alongside traditional Gulf suppliers (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE), much of which is transported via these same maritime corridors.
Key Details
- India's Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR), managed by the Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL) under the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, hold emergency crude stocks at Vishakhapatnam, Mangalore, and Padur, providing limited-duration buffer against supply shocks.
- Disruption at either chokepoint typically raises shipping insurance premiums (war-risk cover) and freight costs, and can force rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope, adding transit time and cost even where physical supply is unaffected.
- India's Navy has periodically undertaken escort and anti-piracy/anti-hijacking deployments in the Gulf of Aden and wider western Indian Ocean since 2008, under Operation Sankalp-type mandates during periods of elevated maritime threat.
A prolonged blockade or attacks near Bab el-Mandeb raise India's energy import costs and elevate the case for continued Indian naval presence in the western Indian Ocean to protect shipping lanes carrying its crude imports.
Non-State Armed Actors and Maritime Law — the Houthi Blockade
Under international law (UNCLOS, 1982), a blockade is traditionally a state-to-state act of war restricting access to an enemy coast; a non-state armed group declaring a "naval blockade" operates outside this classical framework and is generally treated as an act of maritime aggression/piracy-adjacent threat rather than a lawful belligerent blockade, drawing responses under counter-piracy and maritime security cooperation frameworks (e.g., Combined Maritime Forces, IMO conventions).
Key Details
- UNCLOS, 1982 (which India has ratified) governs freedom of navigation and states' rights in territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and high seas, underpinning international objections to non-state blockade declarations.
- The Houthi movement has periodically targeted shipping in the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb corridor since late 2023, initially framed around the Gaza conflict, illustrating how regional conflicts can spill into global maritime trade routes.
- India has engaged multilaterally (e.g., through Combined Maritime Forces-linked coordination and independent naval deployments) to safeguard commercial shipping in this corridor during past disruption episodes.
The declared blockade, targeting tankers ferrying crude to India and China, underscores how non-state maritime threats in a chokepoint region can affect India's energy security even without any direct India-Yemen dimension, reinforcing the case for India's "net security provider" role in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
- Bab el-Mandeb carries an estimated 6-7 million barrels per day of crude oil; the Strait of Hormuz carries about 20.9 million barrels per day (~20% of global petroleum liquids consumption).
- Around half of Bab el-Mandeb's crude volume is Saudi-origin (loaded at Yanbu); a large share of the rest is Russian crude, much of it bound for India.
- India imports roughly 85-88% of its crude oil requirement, making it highly exposed to Gulf/Red Sea chokepoint disruptions.
- The Houthi movement first began targeting Red Sea shipping in late 2023; the current blockade declaration marks an escalation directly naming Saudi-linked tankers as targets.