Red Sea: a hinge between West Asia and Horn of Africa
Conflicts and rivalries across West Asia and the Horn of Africa are becoming increasingly interlinked through the Red Sea corridor
The Gaza conflict has spilled into the Red Sea through Houthi attacks on commercial shipping transiting the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
Sudan's ongoing civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is drawing in competing Gulf state patrons
Ethiopia, landlocked since Eritrea's 1993 independence, is seeking renewed access to a Red Sea port, most prominently Assab, raising tensions with Eritrea
Major powers continue to expand military, diplomatic and economic presence along this corridor connecting two historically volatile regions
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait — A Global Chokepoint
The Bab-el-Mandeb ("Gate of Tears") is a narrow strait separating Yemen (Arabian Peninsula) from Djibouti and Eritrea (Horn of Africa), connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. It became globally significant after the Suez Canal opened in 1869, enabling Asia-Europe trade to bypass the Cape of Good Hope route around Africa.
Key Details
- Roughly 10-12% of global maritime trade and about a quarter of global container traffic transits the strait in normal conditions
- It is considered the world's third-busiest oil chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca
- Houthi attacks since late 2023 (in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict) caused shipping traffic through the strait to fall to less than half its normal volume, forcing many vessels toward the longer Cape of Good Hope route
- It links directly to the Suez Canal at the Red Sea's northern end, making the two chokepoints functionally connected for Asia-Europe trade
Houthi attacks on shipping in the strait are the direct mechanism by which the Gaza conflict (West Asia) has produced Red Sea-wide disruption, illustrating how instability in one sub-region cascades into the other.
Ethiopia's Landlocked Status and the Quest for Sea Access
Ethiopia became landlocked in 1993 when Eritrea gained independence and took over the Red Sea coastline, including the ports of Assab and Massawa. Ethiopia currently depends on the Port of Djibouti for over 95% of its trade, costing it more than $1 billion annually in port fees.
Key Details
- Ethiopia has publicly pushed to regain access to Assab port, straining relations with Eritrea, which withdrew from the regional bloc IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) in December 2025 partly over this issue
- Article 125 of UNCLOS (1982) recognizes a "freedom of transit" right for landlocked states to access the sea through neighbouring territory, though Ethiopia is not a UNCLOS signatory, and the principle is invoked more as customary international law than binding treaty law
- Egypt's move to upgrade infrastructure linked to Assab has added a further external actor to what was previously an Ethiopia-Eritrea bilateral dispute
- Ethiopia is Africa's second-most populous country and one of the world's largest landlocked states by population
Ethiopia's port ambitions are a Horn of Africa driver pulling in Gulf states, Egypt and other outside powers who compete for influence over any settlement — directly linking Horn dynamics to the wider Red Sea security picture.
Sudan's Civil War and Gulf State Rivalry
Sudan's civil war, ongoing since April 2023, pits the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The conflict has become a proxy arena for competing Gulf powers, illustrating how West Asian (Gulf) rivalries are being projected into the Horn of Africa.
Key Details
- The UAE has been identified as the RSF's principal external patron, providing financial, military and logistical support, reportedly via supply routes through neighbouring states
- Saudi Arabia and Egypt have generally favoured the SAF as the legitimate state authority, though Saudi backing has reportedly become more cautious amid wider regional tensions
- A US-led "Quad" (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt) proposed a roadmap to end the war in 2025, but rising Saudi-UAE friction elsewhere in the region (including in Yemen) has undermined the initiative
- Sudan's Red Sea coastline (Port Sudan) gives the conflict direct maritime-security relevance, including alleged arms transit routes toward Yemen
The Sudan conflict shows Gulf rivalries (a West Asian dynamic) being fought by proxy in the Horn of Africa, reinforcing the "hinge" framing of the Red Sea as a single interconnected security theatre.
Djibouti and Great-Power Military Basing
Djibouti, at the Horn of Africa's tip on the Bab-el-Mandeb, hosts the world's densest concentration of foreign military bases, reflecting how major powers view control of this corridor as strategically indispensable.
Key Details
- The US operates Camp Lemonnier, its only permanent base on the African continent and headquarters for Africa Command's Horn of Africa task force (over 4,000 personnel)
- China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, located a few miles from Camp Lemonnier
- France (the former colonial power) and Japan (its first-ever overseas base, opened 2011) also maintain facilities there, alongside Italy
- Djibouti earns an estimated $300 million a year (roughly 10% of its GDP) from base-hosting fees, with the US alone reportedly paying around $65 million annually
The clustering of US, Chinese, French and Japanese bases in Djibouti demonstrates the "major powers expanding military, diplomatic and economic presence" described in the news, underscoring the corridor's status as a live great-power competition zone.
- Bab-el-Mandeb Strait carries an estimated 10-12% of global maritime trade and about a quarter of global container traffic in normal times
- Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea's independence in 1993; over 95% of its trade currently moves through Djibouti
- Sudan's civil war (SAF vs RSF) has been ongoing since April 2023; UAE is identified as RSF's main external backer, Saudi Arabia/Egypt lean toward SAF
- Djibouti hosts military bases of the US (Camp Lemonnier, since 2001-02, over 4,000 troops), China (since 2017), France, Japan (since 2011) and Italy
- UNCLOS Article 125 (1982) codifies "freedom of transit" for landlocked states to access the sea
- Eritrea withdrew from IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) in December 2025