China This Week | What 3 new developments in China’s military and space sectors reveal
China conducted a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test into open Pacific waters, marking the first time it has publicly launched such a missile from a nuclear-powered submarine into international waters, signalling its sea-based nuclear strike capability to the wider Indo-Pacific.
The test coincided with the start of an annual bilateral military exercise between China and Russia.
Continuing a multi-year anti-corruption campaign, senior Chinese military officers — including figures associated with the PLA Rocket Force and Central Military Commission — have faced investigation or loss of official status, part of a broader pattern of purges within China's top military leadership.
China's space programme continued its high launch cadence, including a satellite-group launch for a commercial low-orbit constellation and continued build-out of the Tiangong space station, underscoring the dual-use (civil-military) character of Chinese space activity.
China's Nuclear Triad and the PLA Rocket Force
A nuclear triad refers to the capability to deliver nuclear weapons via three platforms: land-based missiles, strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), created in the 2015-16 PLA reorganisation from the earlier Second Artillery Corps, is the branch responsible for China's land-based ballistic and hypersonic missile arsenal and is treated as a core pillar of Beijing's strategic deterrence.
Key Details
- PLARF was established on 31 December 2015 (formally renamed from the "Second Artillery Corps" effective 1 January 2016), becoming a full service on par with the PLA Army, Navy and Air Force.
- It reports directly to China's Central Military Commission (CMC), outside the regular theatre command structure, to ensure tight political control over nuclear assets.
- An SLBM test into open Pacific waters demonstrates the submarine leg of the triad — a capability distinct from land-based ICBMs operated by the PLARF.
The SLBM test and the leadership turbulence within the Rocket Force both concern the same institution responsible for China's strategic missile forces, illustrating the interplay between capability development and internal military governance.
China's Military Anti-Corruption Purges and Civil-Military Oversight
Since around 2023, China has conducted a sustained purge of senior military leadership, beginning with the Rocket Force and extending to top Central Military Commission figures. These purges have been linked to concerns over corruption in procurement and equipment readiness, including reported technical failures in missile systems.
Key Details
- The first wave of purges (from 2023) targeted Rocket Force leadership over corruption and equipment-quality concerns.
- Subsequent investigations have reportedly reached senior CMC-level officers, reflecting continued instability in the PLA's top command even as China pursues its 2027 military modernisation target.
- The Central Military Commission, chaired by the General Secretary of the Communist Party, is China's highest military decision-making body — command of the armed forces runs through the Party, not the state government.
The reported loss of official status for senior generals reflects continuing internal accountability action within the same command structure that oversees China's strategic missile and space forces.
Dual-Use Nature of China's Space Programme
Civil and military space activity in China are closely integrated, with launches serving both commercial/scientific and strategic purposes. China's space programme is run through state entities alongside a dedicated PLA Aerospace Force function, and its expanding satellite constellations and space station serve both civilian and reconnaissance/communications purposes.
Key Details
- China's Long March rocket family has completed over 650 flights to date, underlining the scale of its launch programme.
- The Tiangong space station is being expanded from three to six modules, alongside a co-orbiting space telescope.
- Commercial mega-constellation launches (e.g., for low-orbit satellite networks) sit alongside strategic space assets, reflecting China's dual-use approach to space infrastructure.
The same week's space-sector activity — a satellite constellation launch and continued space station expansion — is read alongside the SLBM test as part of a broader pattern of China demonstrating simultaneous military and space capability.
- PLARF was established 31 December 2015 as China's fourth PLA service branch, reporting directly to the Central Military Commission.
- The 2026 SLBM test reportedly flew roughly 7,300 km and was the first Chinese SLBM launch into international open waters.
- China's military purges have run since 2023, starting with the Rocket Force and reportedly reaching senior CMC-level officers by 2026.
- The Long March rocket series has completed over 650 launches; Tiangong is being expanded from three to six modules.