War on Iran | The story of a shipwrecked hegemon
The United States and Israel launched a military campaign against Iran beginning February 28, 2026, targeting Iranian missiles, air defenses, military infras...
What Happened
- The United States and Israel launched a military campaign against Iran beginning February 28, 2026, targeting Iranian missiles, air defenses, military infrastructure, and nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan.
- A preliminary ceasefire Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was reached on June 15, 2026, providing for a 60-day pause in hostilities, IAEA inspections of Iran's nuclear program, and a mechanism to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states — Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE — suffered Iranian retaliatory drone and ballistic missile strikes during the conflict, triggering an economic shock across the region.
- Israel, which was not a party to the US-Iran MoU, continued operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah; Hezbollah similarly rejected the ceasefire framework, leaving the Lebanon front unresolved.
- The conflict has accelerated a diplomatic realignment in the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman moving to re-engage Iran on bilateral terms, signaling a reduced reliance on the US security umbrella.
Static Topic Bridges
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA Safeguards Regime
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. It rests on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament (Article VI), and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Iran is a signatory to the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) administers safeguards agreements with NPT member states to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to weapons use.
- Iran had accumulated 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 before the military strikes — the only NNWS to have done so.
- Following the strikes, Iran informed the IAEA in February 2026 that normal safeguards were "legally untenable and materially impracticable," leaving the agency unable to verify enrichment status.
- The 2026 US-Iran MoU codifies a return to IAEA inspections as a key test of implementation.
- The 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document explicitly stated that attacks on nuclear facilities "raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force."
- Iran's parliament drafted legislation to withdraw from the NPT following the strikes, echoing concerns that the war undermines the nonproliferation regime globally.
Connection to this news: The fragile ceasefire hinges on IAEA access — making the NPT safeguards framework the central diplomatic instrument going forward, with significant implications for global non-proliferation norms.
Freedom of Navigation and the Law of the Sea
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. It is approximately 33 km wide at its narrowest, with navigable shipping lanes of only a few kilometres. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), ships of all states enjoy the right of transit passage through international straits used for international navigation. Both Iran and Oman have sovereignty over the waters of the strait.
- In 2025, approximately 15 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil — nearly 34% of global crude oil trade — passed through the Strait of Hormuz.
- About 93% of Qatar's and 96% of the UAE's LNG exports transit through the strait, representing 19% of global LNG trade.
- 84% of oil flowing through the strait goes to Asian markets, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea as the top destinations.
- Iran's near-total blockade during the conflict disrupted approximately 46–50% of India's crude oil imports and around 90% of its LPG imports.
- The MoU established a "communication line" to ensure safe passage of commercial vessels, directly addressing UNCLOS transit passage rights.
Connection to this news: The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz was the central economic imperative behind the US-Iran MoU; its closure had demonstrated how a single chokepoint can paralyse global energy supply chains.
The Doctrine of Strategic Autonomy and India's West Asia Policy
India's foreign policy doctrine of strategic autonomy — maintaining independent positions rather than aligning with any single power bloc — was severely tested by the 2026 Iran war. India has historically balanced relationships with Israel (elevated to a Special Strategic Partnership), Iran (Chabahar Port and INSTC connectivity), and Gulf Arab states (Indian diaspora, energy imports), all while avoiding open confrontation with the United States.
- India's US sanctions waiver for the Chabahar Port expired on April 26, 2026, with the Union Budget 2026 allocating zero funds for the project.
- Chabahar is the southern node of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-km multimodal network connecting India to Russia through Iran.
- India issued calls for de-escalation but avoided naming aggressors, a position criticized both domestically and internationally.
- Iran is a BRICS member; China and Russia vocally supported Tehran, creating pressure on India's non-aligned stance.
- The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz directly affected India's energy security, underscoring the limits of economic hedging without a clear political position.
Connection to this news: The US-Iran ceasefire offers India an opportunity to re-engage on Chabahar and INSTC, but the episode has exposed the costs of ambiguity when core energy and connectivity interests are at stake.
UN Charter and the Use of Force in International Law
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Exceptions are recognized only under Article 51 (self-defense) and Chapter VII (Security Council authorization). Pre-emptive strikes on another state's nuclear facilities without Security Council authorization have been contested under international law since the Israeli strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981.
- The 2026 US-Israel strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities were not authorized by the UN Security Council; Russia and China would have vetoed any such resolution.
- Critics invoked the ICJ's 1986 Nicaragua judgment (affirming that armed force cannot be used to coerce policy changes) and the 2004 High-level Panel report's criteria for legitimate use of force.
- The strikes set a contested precedent: that military action against nuclear enrichment programs is permissible as a form of counter-proliferation, even absent an immediate armed attack.
- The Gulf War (1990–91) and the 2003 Iraq War both showed divergent Security Council dynamics — the former had broad multilateral authorization, the latter did not.
Connection to this news: The US-Iran war and its contested legal basis are likely to feature in Mains GS2 questions on international law, use of force, and the UN's role in conflict prevention.
Key Facts & Data
- US-Israel military campaign against Iran began: February 28, 2026.
- Preliminary ceasefire MoU signed: June 15, 2026 (60-day framework).
- Iranian uranium enrichment level before strikes: up to 60% U-235 (440.9 kg stockpile).
- Nuclear weapons-grade enrichment threshold: approximately 90% U-235.
- Strait of Hormuz crude oil transit (2025): ~15 mb/d, ~34% of global crude oil trade.
- India's crude oil import disruption due to Hormuz blockade: approximately 46–50%.
- Chabahar Port US sanctions waiver expired: April 26, 2026.
- INSTC total corridor length: approximately 7,200 km (India–Iran–Russia).
- GCC nations struck by Iranian retaliation: Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE.
- Iran's NPT status: Non-Nuclear Weapon State (signatory since 1968, ratified 1970).