BRICS Summit: PM Modi warns against weaponisation of technology, critical minerals
Addressing a BRICS session at Bharat Mandapam, the Prime Minister warned that weaponising technology and critical minerals threatens shared global progress and called for resilient, diversified supply chains.
He urged wider and more inclusive access to technology for developing economies rather than restrictive, unilateral controls concentrated among a few dominant producers.
The New Delhi Declaration adopted at the summit incorporated this concern, calling for critical-mineral supply chains that are "reliable, responsible, diversified, resilient, fair, sustainable, and just."
The remarks continue a position India has taken at successive BRICS summits (including at Rio in July 2025) against using critical-mineral or technology dominance for unilateral leverage.
WTO Rules on Export Restrictions: The GATT Article XI/XX Framework
When a country restricts exports of a raw material it dominates, the relevant global trade-rule discipline is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XI, which prohibits quantitative export restrictions (though not export duties), subject to limited exceptions under Article XX for conservation of exhaustible natural resources or protection of health.
Key Details
- The WTO Appellate Body ruled against China in the "China — Raw Materials" dispute (2012) and the "China — Rare Earths" dispute (2014), finding that China's export quotas on materials such as bauxite, coke, and rare earths were not justified under Article XX's conservation exception because China did not simultaneously restrict its own domestic consumption.
- These rulings established that a WTO member cannot use export restrictions to give its domestic industry a supply-chain advantage while still exporting through commercial channels to processors abroad.
- Despite these precedents, dominant producers have continued imposing licensing and authorisation requirements on critical-mineral exports (rather than outright quotas), a workaround that is harder to challenge under the same Article XI/XX framework — the structural trade-law gap underlying "weaponisation" concerns.
The Prime Minister's call for "fair" and "rules-based" supply chains implicitly invokes this unresolved WTO dispute history — global trade rules exist on paper to discipline export restrictions, but practical enforcement has proven weak against newer forms of licensing-based control.
Dual-Use Technology Export Controls: The Wassenaar Arrangement
Beyond raw materials, "weaponisation of technology" also refers to export controls on dual-use goods and technologies (items with both civilian and military applications, such as advanced semiconductors), governed internationally by voluntary regimes rather than binding treaties.
Key Details
- The Wassenaar Arrangement, established in 1996 as the successor to the Cold War-era CoCom regime, is the principal multilateral export-control regime for conventional arms and dual-use goods/technologies; it now has 42 participating states.
- India joined the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2017 as its 42nd member and held the plenary chair for a term starting January 2023.
- Because Wassenaar operates by consensus and voluntary national implementation (not binding international law), individual members — and non-members such as China — can and do impose unilateral, non-Wassenaar export controls (e.g., on semiconductor manufacturing equipment or rare-earth-derived magnets), which is the structural gap the Prime Minister's remarks are pointing to.
India's own Wassenaar membership gives it a seat inside the formal dual-use control architecture, even as it argues at BRICS that technology and mineral controls exercised outside that consensus framework risk becoming tools of unilateral leverage rather than shared security.
India's Twin-Track Response: Domestic Mission Plus Plurilateral Partnerships
India is pursuing critical-mineral security simultaneously through domestic capacity-building and membership in multiple, sometimes competing, international groupings — a "multi-alignment" strategy distinct from exclusive bloc alignment.
Key Details
- Domestically, the National Critical Mineral Mission (approved January 2025, ~₹34,300 crore outlay over FY2024-25 to FY2030-31) funds exploration, processing, recycling and overseas asset acquisition via KABIL (Khanij Bidesh India Ltd).
- Internationally, India participates in the US-led Minerals Security Partnership (launched 2022) and the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative (with the US, Japan, and Australia), even while raising "fair and just" supply-chain language through BRICS with China and Russia at the table.
- This dual engagement lets India hedge against dependency on any single bloc's critical-mineral or technology architecture, a strategic posture Mains answers on India's foreign economic policy often term "multi-alignment."
The BRICS remarks on weaponisation should be read alongside India's parallel Western-aligned mineral partnerships — the underlying goal in both cases is diversified, non-coercive supply-chain access rather than alignment with any single geopolitical camp.
- WTO Appellate Body rulings against China on export restrictions: "Raw Materials" dispute (2012), "Rare Earths" dispute (2014) — both found Article XX exceptions inapplicable.
- Wassenaar Arrangement: established 1996 (successor to CoCom); 42 participating states; India joined December 2017, held plenary chair from January 2023.
- National Critical Mineral Mission: approved January 2025, outlay ~₹34,300 crore, FY2024-25 to FY2030-31.
- Minerals Security Partnership: launched 2022, US-led; India is a participating member alongside its BRICS engagement.