Manufacturing Overcapacity
Concept and India's Position
Updated 17 Oct 2026: Added what the 15 economies agreed to do at technical meetings before December 2026: share non-confidential data and build on OECD work.
Manufacturing overcapacity (also called excess capacity) means that factories in a country or sector can produce much more than the market actually needs, at prices that cover costs. The extra capacity does not shut down, often because a government keeps supporting it. Instead, the surplus goods are sold abroad at very low prices. This can drive out producers in other countries, even efficient ones. It is one of the biggest fights in world trade today, especially in steel, solar panels, electric vehicles and batteries.
Why does it matter?
In a normal market, if too many factories make the same product, prices fall, the weakest firms make losses and close, and supply comes back in line with demand. Overcapacity becomes a global problem when this cleaning-up does not happen. Think of a sweet shop owner whose rich uncle pays all his losses. He can keep selling laddoos below cost for years.
The other sweet shops on the street, which have no such uncle, slowly go out of business, even if their laddoos are better. When that happens across countries, jobs and whole industries move, not because of efficiency, but because of government money.
How does it happen?
Overcapacity usually builds up through a mix of these:
- Subsidies: cash grants, cheap land, cheap electricity, tax breaks.
- Cheap credit: state-owned banks lending at low interest, even to loss-making firms.
- State-owned enterprises (SOEs): government-owned firms that may be told to keep producing to protect jobs, even at a loss.
- Local government competition: provinces or states each building their own factories in "priority" sectors, so total capacity overshoots.
- Weak domestic demand: if people at home do not buy enough, the extra output is pushed into exports.
How is it measured?
Economists use the capacity utilisation rate: actual output divided by the maximum possible output. If a steel plant can make 100 tonnes but makes 74, its utilisation is 74%. A rate that stays low for years signals excess capacity. China's official statistics bureau reported industrial capacity utilisation of 74.4% for 2025.
Where did the debate come from?
- 2000s, the "China shock": After China joined the WTO in 2001, its exports grew very fast. A well-known 2013 study by economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson found that rising Chinese imports caused large manufacturing job losses in parts of the United States.
- Steel crisis and G20 response (2016): At the G20 Hangzhou Summit (2016), leaders agreed to create the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity (GFSEC). It was formally set up on 16 December 2016 in Berlin, facilitated by the OECD, with all G20 members and some OECD members.
- China steps out of the steel forum (2019): At the GFSEC ministerial meeting in Tokyo in October 2019, China did not join the consensus to extend the forum. It argued the forum's work was done. China has stayed out since then, while most other members chose to continue the forum's work.
- New sectors (2020s): The worry spread from steel and aluminium to "new economy" products: solar panels, polysilicon, lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles (EVs).
- China's own response (2025): China itself has accepted that cut-throat price wars are a problem at home. It calls them "involution" (excessive, self-defeating competition). At a meeting of its Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission on 1 July 2025, it called for curbing disorderly low-price competition and phasing out outdated capacity.
- Beyond steel: the 15-economy statement (October 2026): G20 Trade Ministers met in Milwaukee (USA) on 30 September and 1 October 2026 but could not agree on common words about overcapacity. So on 7 October 2026, 15 economies signed a separate Joint Ministerial Statement on Addressing Structural Excess Capacity and Production. The signatories are Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Poland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. China did not sign.
What does the 2026 statement say?
It moves the fight beyond steel to other factory sectors. Its main points are:
- It calls on all countries to end "structural excess capacity": surplus that lasts for years, would not exist in a free market, and is created or kept alive by government policies.
- It asks countries to stop non-market policies: government actions, like huge subsidies, that override normal market signals.
- It sets up new sectoral platforms (separate working groups for each industry) for five sectors to start with: autos and EVs, batteries, chemicals, foundational semiconductors and solar panels. Foundational semiconductors are the older, simpler chips used in cars, appliances and machines.
- Officials began work on the margins of the OECD Trade Committee and promised technical meetings before December 2026. There they will draft terms of reference (the written rules for how the work will be done), exchange non-confidential data on excess capacity, its effects and the steps taken to reduce it, and find gaps in the data, building on OECD work.
- It warns that overcapacity can make other countries depend on one supplier, which leaves them open to economic coercion, such as sudden export bans.
The key numbers for steel
According to the OECD's Steel Outlook 2026:
- Global steelmaking capacity reached a record 2,445 million tonnes (Mt) in 2025, even though world steel demand fell for the fourth year in a row.
- Global excess capacity was about 640 Mt in 2025, more than the entire steel output of OECD countries by over 200 Mt.
- It may reach 745 Mt by 2028.
- China accounted for about 54% of the world's gap between capacity and demand (third quarter of 2025).
How do countries respond?
Most responses use WTO-approved tools or go beyond them:
- Anti-dumping duty: when goods are exported below their "normal value" (usually the home-market price) and harm local industry.
- Countervailing duty (CVD): when exported goods are cheap because of foreign subsidies. The WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) governs this.
- Safeguard duty: when there is a sudden surge of imports, even fair ones, that seriously injures local producers.
- Unilateral tariffs: big extra tariffs outside the normal WTO trade-remedy process. For example, in May 2024 the US raised its tariff on Chinese EVs to 100% under Section 301 of its Trade Act of 1974. In October 2024, the European Union put countervailing duties of 7.8% to 35.3% on Chinese battery electric vehicles for five years.
- Industrial policy at home: building domestic capacity with incentives, like India's Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes.
India's position and Indian examples
India is both a victim and a careful player in this debate.
- Trade deficit with China: In 2024-25, India imported about US$113.5 billion of goods from China and exported only about US$14.3 billion, a deficit of about US$99.2 billion. Electronics, solar cells and batteries are large parts of these imports.
- Heavy use of trade remedies: India is one of the world's most active users of anti-dumping action. The Directorate General of Trade Remedies (DGTR), under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, investigates and recommends duties, and the Ministry of Finance imposes them. For example, India imposed anti-dumping duty on solar glass from China and Vietnam in December 2024 after imports from China jumped from about 29,000 tonnes in 2020-21 to about 6.6 lakh tonnes.
- Steel safeguard: Facing a surge of cheap steel imports, India imposed a safeguard duty on certain flat steel products for three years: 12% (21 April 2025 to 20 April 2026), 11.5% (to 20 April 2027) and 11% (to 20 April 2028).
- Building capacity at home: PLI schemes for solar modules, batteries and electronics aim to reduce dependence on imports from one country.
- Signing the 2026 statement: India is one of the 15 signatories of the October 2026 Joint Ministerial Statement. By signing, India joined the call to end non-market policies, while also protecting its own industries from cheap surplus goods. Other G20 members such as China, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa did not sign.
- India's balance: India supports action against unfair, subsidy-driven overcapacity, but it also defends its own right to support farmers and developing industries. So India argues for rules that separate harmful subsidies from genuine development support.
Commonly confused concepts
- Overcapacity vs dumping: Overcapacity is the cause (too much production capacity). Dumping is one effect (exporting below normal value). Overcapacity can exist without dumping if the extra goods are not exported cheaply.
- Dumping vs predatory pricing: Dumping is about price differences between countries (selling abroad cheaper than at home). Predatory pricing is about intent: deliberately pricing below cost to kill competitors and later raise prices. The terms overlap in political speech but are different ideas in law.
- Anti-dumping duty vs countervailing duty vs safeguard duty: Anti-dumping targets unfair pricing by companies. Countervailing duty targets unfair subsidies by governments. Safeguard duty needs no unfair act at all; it responds to a sudden import surge.
- Excess capacity vs spare capacity: Every economy keeps some spare capacity to handle demand spikes, and that is healthy. "Excess capacity" in trade debates means large, lasting surplus kept alive by state support.
- GFSEC vs the 2026 sectoral platforms: GFSEC (2016) covers steel only and was created with the whole G20 agreeing. The 2026 sectoral platforms cover autos and EVs, batteries, chemicals, foundational semiconductors and solar panels, and were set up by 15 willing economies outside a full G20 consensus.
Issues, criticism and the way forward
- No agreed definition: There is no WTO rule that bans "overcapacity" as such. Countries disagree on what counts as harmful, so G20 statements often fail, as they did in Milwaukee in 2026. That is why the October 2026 statement came from only 15 economies, not the whole G20.
- China's view: China rejects the charge. It argues its industries are competitive because of scale and efficiency, and that "overcapacity" claims are an excuse for protectionism.
- Weak WTO enforcement: The WTO Appellate Body (its top appeals court) has been unable to work since 11 December 2019, because the US blocked appointment of new judges. So countries cannot get final, binding rulings on subsidy disputes. Some members formed a temporary appeal arrangement (the MPIA, April 2020), but India has not joined it.
- Risk of a tariff war: Unilateral tariffs can provoke retaliation and hurt consumers through higher prices. Cheap imports can also help clean-energy goals, as with cheap solar panels.
- Gaps in the SCM Agreement: Its rules were written in 1995 and do not clearly cover modern forms of support, like cheap loans from state banks or support through SOEs. Many experts suggest updating them.
- Way forward: more transparency about subsidies (WTO notifications), updated subsidy rules, restoring a working dispute settlement system, sector forums like the GFSEC, and for India, faster trade-remedy decisions plus stronger domestic manufacturing.
Concepts to Know
- Capacity utilisation: How much a factory or industry actually produces compared with the most it could produce. Low, lasting utilisation signals overcapacity.
- Subsidy: Money or help a government gives a business, such as a grant, a cheap loan or a tax break.
- Normal value: In anti-dumping law, the usual price of a product in the exporter's home market, used to check if exports are "too cheap".
- State-owned enterprise (SOE): A company owned and controlled by the government.
- Trade deficit: When a country's imports from another country are worth more than its exports to it.
- Appellate Body: The WTO's seven-member appeals court that hears appeals against dispute panel rulings.
- Unilateral: Done by one country alone, without agreement from others.
- Structural excess capacity: Surplus capacity that is long-lasting and built into the system, usually because of state support. It is different from a short dip in demand during a slowdown, which fixes itself when demand recovers.
- Non-market policies: Government actions, like heavy subsidies, cheap state loans or orders to SOEs, that make firms produce what a normal market would not pay for.
- Economic coercion: When a country uses trade as a weapon, for example by suddenly stopping exports, to pressure another country.
- Non-confidential data: Information a government can share openly with others because it contains no trade secrets or sensitive company details.
- GFSEC: agreed at G20 Hangzhou Summit 2016; set up 16 December 2016, Berlin; facilitated by OECD
- China stepped out of GFSEC after the Tokyo ministerial, October 2019
- Joint Ministerial Statement on Addressing Structural Excess Capacity and Production: released by the USTR on 7 October 2026, 15 signatories including India; China not a signatory
- 2026 sectoral platforms: autos and EVs, batteries, chemicals, foundational semiconductors, solar panels
- Global steel capacity 2025: 2,445 Mt (record); excess capacity about 640 Mt (2025), projected 745 Mt by 2028 (OECD Steel Outlook 2026)
- China's share of global steel capacity-demand gap: about 54% (Q3 2025)
- China industrial capacity utilisation 2025: 74.4%
- China joined WTO: 2001; "China shock" study: Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013)
- US Section 301 tariff on Chinese EVs: 100% (May 2024); EU CVD on Chinese BEVs: 7.8% to 35.3% (from 30 October 2024, five years)
- India's trade deficit with China, 2024-25: about US$99.2 billion (imports US$113.5 billion, exports US$14.3 billion)
- India's steel safeguard duty: 12% to 11.5% to 11%, from 21 April 2025 to 20 April 2028
- Trade remedy bodies in India: DGTR investigates and recommends; Ministry of Finance imposes
- WTO Appellate Body non-functional since 11 December 2019; India not in the MPIA
- 17 Oct 2026Added what the 15 economies agreed to do at technical meetings before December 2026: share non-confidential data and build on OECD work.
- 9 Oct 2026Added the October 2026 15-economy statement on structural excess capacity, signed by India, and China's 2019 exit from the steel forum.
● Tracked since May 04, 2026 · last seen October 15, 2026 · updates as the daily brief publishes