International Relations GS 2 In the news 6 times

Iran's Nuclear Program

Enrichment, Weaponisation Threshold, and Strategic Calculations

Iran's nuclear program is one of the most monitored in the world by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The core question is not whether Iran can enrich uranium — it legally can under NPT Article IV for peaceful purposes — but whether it is approaching weapons-grade enrichment and the ability to assemble a nuclear device (the "breakout" threshold).

Key details

Uranium enrichment levels: natural uranium (~0.7% U-235) → reactor fuel (~3-5%) → highly enriched uranium (HEU, 20%+) → weapons-grade (~90%).
Iran had enriched to 83.7% U-235 purity at Fordow facility (confirmed by IAEA, January 2023) — very close to weapons-grade.
"Breakout time": the time needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb — IAEA estimated Iran's breakout time at under two weeks by 2023 (down from 12 months under the JCPOA).
Key enrichment sites: Natanz (primary, also centrifuge assembly), Fordow (buried underground, harder to strike), Arak (heavy water reactor, plutonium pathway).
Operation Midnight Hammer (June 2025): US-Israel joint strikes targeted Fordow and other facilities — damage was significant, but underground fortification at Fordow limited the destruction; Iran retains enrichment knowledge and some infrastructure.
Iran's "latent deterrence" strategy: maintaining enrichment capability and a nuclear threshold position without assembling a weapon, as a deterrent against regime change.

In the news

● Tracked since February 26, 2026 · last seen May 21, 2026 · updates as the daily brief publishes

21 May '26

Mojtaba forbids export of enriched uranium: officials

International Relations

13 Apr '26

What the US-Iran talks collapse says about their approach to negotiations

International Relations

08 Apr '26

Iran 10-point plan says U.S. must accept uranium enrichment, lift all sanctions

International Relations

03 Mar '26